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THE FALLACY OF WEIGHTING 
ASSET VALUE AND EARNIN.GS 
VALUE IN THE APPRAISAL 
OFCORPORATESTQCK 
ELMER J. SCHAEFER* 
A minority shareholder who objects to a corporate merger will often be 
entitled to an appraisal of her shares, a procedure which, if successful, 
will lead to a cash award. 1 A common characteristic of appraisals in 
Delaware and in other jurisdictions is the valuation of corporate shares 
by a weighted average of several values, typically net asset value, earn-
ings value, and market value? The adequacy of the appraisal remedy 
has been the subject of much debate, but criticism usually has focused 
on matters of procedure and timing rather than on the validity of the 
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, M~hall-Wythe School of 
Law. B.A. 1961, Northwestern University; M.A. 1965, Harvard University; J.D. 1968, Harvard 
University. 
The author wishes to thank Patrick Nooney of the William and Mary Class of 1978 for his 
assistance at an early stage in the preparation of this Article and Randolph Baker of the Class of 
1981 and Randolph Frostick of the Class of 1982 for assistance at a later stage. Part of the work 
on the Article was done during a semester of research leave, funded by the College of William and 
Mary. Part of this Article was presented at the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the Southern Eco-
uomic Association in Washington, D.C. (November 6, 1980). 
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1980); MoDEL BUSiNESS CoRP. Acr §§ 80-
81 (1979). See generally A. CONARD, CoRPORATIONS lN PERSPECTiVE§§ 134-37, at 240-45 (1976); 
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OrnER BUSINESS ENTERPRiSES§ 349, 
at 723-24 (2d ed. 1970); Conard, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting .Dissent-
ers' Rights,A Report oj"the Committee on Corporate Laws, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Report oj"the Committee]. 
2. See, e.g., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (DeL Ch. 
1973), qjf'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975). See generally i'!fra note 28 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of use of weighting method). 
For appraisal decisions using the weighting method in other jurisdictions, see Flarsheim v. 
Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1968); In re Tudor City Fifth 
Unit, Inc., 17 A.D.2d 794, 232 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1962); Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 
249 (N.D. 1971); Fogelsong v. Thurston Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 606 (Okla. 1976); Santee Oil 
Co., Inc. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 798 (1975). Delaware law is of particular nationwide 
importance because of the large number of enterprises that are incorporated in Delaware. 
For an explanation of asset value, earnings value, and market value, see infra note 29 and text 
accompanying notes 30-33. · 
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weighting method of valuation.3 The explanations offered for the use 
of the weighting method are unclear;4 one is reminded of Dylan 
Thomas' children's book which told him "everything about the wasp, 
except why."5 
Despite the lack of an expressed rationale, the weighting method is 
often assumed to result in accurate valuations of corporate stock. This 
assumption is incorrect. As this Article demonstrates, the weighting 
method systematically tends to undervalue corporate shares. The im-
plications of this observation extend beyond the need to improve valua-
tion techniques in appraisals. By their terms, appraisal statutes apply 
to all mergers, but, in practice, most appraisal cases which have been 
litigated through the appellate court level involve conflicts of interest; 
the outside shareholders have been frozen out on terms dictated by in-
siders.6 For this reason, there is a compelling need for a remedy which 
produces accurate valuations in appraisal proceedings. 
I. THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE WEIGHTING METHOD 
LEADS TO ACCURATE VALUATIONS 
This Article does not criticize the propriety of granting appraisal rights 
to dissenting shareholders. Instead, this Article criticizes the use of the 
weighting method to determine the value of dissenters' shares in ap-
praisal proceedings. Courts and commentators have generally assumed 
that use of the weighting method leads to accurate estimations of cor-
porate share value.7 As this Article demonstrates, however, the weight-
ing method consistently underestimates the value of corporate shares, 
3. See, e.g., infra notes 8-9. 
4. For authorities listing the reasons typically given for the choice of a particular set of 
weights, see infra note 36. 
5. D. THOMAS, A CHILD'S CHRISTMAS IN WALES 16 (1969). 
6. For example, of the thirteen cases listed in a recently published chart, Note, The J)lssenl-
ing Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 629, 641-42 (1977), eleven involved con-
flict-of-interest mergers: Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 285, 224 A.2d 260, 261 
(Del. 1966); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 412, 213 A.2d 203, 205 (Del. 1965); 
Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 463 (Del. Ch. 1975); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., .312 A.2d 344, 346 (Del. Ch. 1973), qff'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); In 
re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 801-03 (Del. Ch. 1968); Swanton v. State Guar. 
Corp., 42 DeL Ch. 477, 479, 215 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. Ch. 1965); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & 
Co., 39 DeL Ch. 76, 79, 159 A.2d 278, 280 (Del. Ch. 1960); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 
35 Del. Ch. 560, 563, 123 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. Ch. 1956); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis.. 
Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (Del. Ch. 1950) (conflict shown in MOODY'S MANUAL 
OF INvESTMENTS, INDUSTRIAL SECURITIES 727 (1949)); In re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 29 
DeL Ch. 480, 483, 52 A.2d 6, 8 (Del. Ch. 1947); Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 
249, 251-52 (N.D. 1971). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 8-25. 
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and, therefore, deprives dissenting shareholders of the full benefit of 
their appraisal remedy. 
General approval of the weighting method is evidenced by the fact 
that the validity of its use has seldom been discussed, 8 even though 
extensive and severe criticisms have been directed at other aspects of 
the appraisal remedy.9 The assumption that the weighting method ac-
curately measures share value underlies one commentator's recent as-
sertion that "an appraisal based on full disclosure, in which a conscious 
attempt is made to err on the high side, produces a price that will ade-
quately compensate remaining shareholders."10 
Misplaced confidence in the weighting method is also apparent in 
assertions that appraisal is an adequate remedy for shareholders who 
object to conflict-of-interest mergers. In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green, 11 the United States Supreme Court held that no relief was avail-
able under rule lOb-5 for a minority shareholder who claimed that he 
had been forced to surrender his shares at an unfair price in a freeze-
out, 12 but who did not allege any misrepresentation by the defendants. 
8. See i'!fra text accompanying notes 10-25. But see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1457, 1459 (5th ed. 1980) (questioning whether a corporation 
should be valued at less than its liquidation value); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A 
Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 624, 653-54, 672, 679-80 (1981) (arguing that weighting 
method ignores ability of insiders to make the most efficient use of a company's resources after a 
freezeout); Dyer, An Essay on Federalism in Private Actions Under Rule JOb-5, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 
7, 22-23 (contending that because a freezeout is similar to an eminent domain proceeding, an 
appraisal award should be equal to the highest value of the corporation rather than a weighted 
average). 
9. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 
HARv. L. REv. 297, 305-07 (1974) (appraisal valuation, which depends on data from the past, 
unlikely to reflect an increase in earnings which insiders may anticipate); Manning, The Share-
holder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,232-33 (1962) (discussing 
litigation costs, technicality of procedure, taxability of award, unpredictability of the amount of 
the award). One commentator noted that 
[T]he appraisal right presents many difficulties from the shareholder's perspective: It is 
always technical; it may be expensive, it is uncertain in result, and, in the case of a 
publicly held corporation, is unlikely to produce a better result than could have been 
obtained on the market; and the ultimate award is taxable. It is in short, a remedy of 
desperation-generally speaking, no shareholder in a publicly held corporation who is in 
his right mind will invoke the appraisal right unless he feels that the change from which 
he dissents is shockingly improvident and that the fair value of his shares before the 
change will far exceed ihe viilue of his shares after the change. 
Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modem Corporate .Decisionmak-
ing, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 85 (1969). 
10. Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Share-
holder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183, 244 (1979). 
11. 430 u.s. 462 (1977). 
12. "Freezeout" is one of several terms used to refer to a corporate transaction in which 
outside shareholders are forced to give up their stock for cash or nonparticipating senior securities. 
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Justice Stevens, in a brief opinion concurring in the denial of a federal 
remedy, stated that the plaintiff still had an opportunity to obtain the 
fair value of his shares through an appraisal action in the Delaware 
courts. 13 The policy behind this approach was explained by S. Samuel 
Arsht, an eminent member of the Delaware corporate bar, in a speech 
delivered prior to the Green decision. 
In a merger context, ... the appraisal remedy is available to insure 
that minority stockholders are not denied the fair value of their stock 
by the conduct of the majority . . . . 
Absent a vested rights concept, and assuming full disclosure, the 
only reason for denying effect to an otherwise technically correct 
merger is that it operates unfairly with re~pect to minority sharehold-
ers. Such unfairness can only arise if the appraisal proceeding is in-
capable of arriving at the fair value of a minority shareholder's 
stock. 14 
Arsht came close to an explicit endorsement of the weighting method, 
arguing that the Delaware appraisal process, because it considers fac-
tors other than market value, is "able to uncover elements of value tem-
porarily hidden by artificially low stock prices.'ns 
In an economic analysis of corporate freezeouts, Professor Posner, 
now a judge in the Seventh Circuit, implicitly endorsed the weighting 
method of appraisal. He viewed the freezeout mechanism as providing 
the majority with a power of eminent domain over the minority share-
holders when the company would be more valuable as a privately held 
company than it would be with publicly traded shares. 16 Without that 
power, minority shareholders could threaten to prevent the company 
from going private and could thus extract more than the fair value of 
their shares from the majority. Posner concluded: "The appraisal rem-
edy ... should assure that the 'condemnees' [i.e., the minority] re-
ceived the 'fair market value' of their shares. The procedure would be 
See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, .87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357 
(1978). 
13. 430 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
14. Arsht, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts Under .Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAW. 1495, 1499 
(1977). The presentation of the paper on whieh the article was based antedated Singer v. 
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), which held that despite the availability of an appraisal 
remedy, equitable relief may be granted in Delaware ~ess the merger has a legitimate business 
purpose and is entirely fair. I d. at 976-80. A panelist co=enting on Arsht's paper remarked that 
the effect of permitting a federal remedy for going private, where the merger had already been 
completed, would be "merely to substitute the federal District Court for the Delaware court in 
determining what is fair value." Arsht, st~pra, at·1500 (co=ent of Sidney Silberman). 
15. Arsht, st~pra note 14, at 1500. 
16. R. POSNER, ECONOMJ.C ANALYSIS OF LAW 305 (2d ed. 1977). 
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fraudulent in an economic sense only if the Delaware courts refused to 
take seriously their duty of appraisal; and there is no evidence of this 
before the court in Green ;m 
If the use of the weighting method in appraisals leads to fair evalu-
ation, then it would be to the majority's advantage to offer initially a 
fair value to the minority and thereby avoid the cost of litigation. One 
commentator has contended that "availability of an appraisal proceed-
ing provides some assurance that the management of [the parent] will 
not offer an unreasonably low price.''18 
Tacit approval of the weighting method is inherent in legislative 
proposals to expand the scope of the appraisal remedy. The Commit-
tee on Corporate Laws of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law 
section of the American Bar Association recently amended the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 19 expanding the role of dissenters' appraisal 
rights in resolving corporate disputes,2° but providing that those ap-
praisal rights are exclusive except in cases of illegality or fraud. 21 The 
Committee found no fault in the use of the weighting method and in-
tended to leave ''untouched the accumulated case law about market 
value, capitalized earnings value, and asset value."22 Approval of the 
weighting method was also reflected in the Committee's statement that 
dissenters' appraisal rights "in the majority of cases ... lead to a satis-
factory solution of conflicting interests.''23 The Committee stated that 
"[s]ince dissenting shareholders can obtain the fair value of their 
shares, they are protected from pecuniary loss:"24 It therefore recom-
17. Id at 306. 
18. Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 509 
n.69 (1976). q: Folk, .De Facto Mergers in .Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. 
REv. 1261 (1963): 
Appraisal rights . . . have . . . served as a countervailing power to force the insiders to 
tailor their plans to minimize the number of dissenters by getting the best deal possi-
ble. . . . [When such a] weapon is removed, the insiders lack the real self-interest to 
fashion a plan acceptable to a sufficient number of shareholders. 
Id at 1293. 
19. MoDEL BuSINESS CoRP. Acr (1979). 
20. Report of the Committee, supra note 1, at 1859-63. 
21. The Committee pointed out that jurisdictions such as California, Massachusetts, New 
York, and Pennsylvania already consider dissenters' appraisal rights to be their exclusive remedy. 
Id at 1863. Since the Committee's report was issued, Delaware has held that availability of the 
appraisal remedy does not bar other relief if the merger violates the fiduciary duty owed by major-
ity stockholders to the minority. Singer v. Magna vox Co., 380 A.2d 969; 976-80 (Del 1977). For 
an excellent treatmeut of the exclusivity of appraisal remedies, see Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the 
.Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1964). 
22. Report of the Committee, supra note 1, at 1874. 
23. Id at 1856. 
24. Id at 1863. 
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mended that courts refrain from intervention in corporate disputes, 
even when persuaded that a corporate change is unwise or 
disadvantageous.25 
II. THE FALLACY OF THE WEIGHTING METHOD 
Suppose that Subsidiary Company has one million shares of common 
stock, 80% of which are owned by Parent Corporation. Assume further 
that there is no market for the shares of Subsidiary and consequently 
no market value. 26 A freezeout merger is carried out between Parent 
and Subsidiary; Parent's shares in Subsidiary are cancelled, and the 
outside shareholders of Subsidiary receive $50.00 per share. Since the 
terms of the merger were set by Parent's management,27 the minority 
shareholders might disagree with the merger price. 
If the minority dissents, appraisal of the shares in Subsidiary is 
likely to be done by the weighting method.28 Asset value and earnings 
value per share will be estimated, and the appraisal value will be a 
weighted average of the two :figures.29 This method is flawed, however, 
because the intrinsic value of the corporation should be the higher of 
25. Id at 1856. 
26. The treatment of market value in appraisal is disregarded in this Article, except for dis-
cussion infra at notes 29, 196, 213, 275, 315. 
27. The price to the outside shareholders is in effect set by Parent, which controls the negoti-
ations establishing the terms of the merger and has substantial, perhaps even decisive, power in 
any vote on the merger. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 298. 
28. See Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W.L. RE.v. 1, 26-34 (1974); 
Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. RE.v. 1453 (1966); 
Note, supra note 6. 
29. In the example given in the text, it is assumed that there is no market value and therefore 
this measure would be omitted from the weighted average. In the more general case, where the 
weighted average of asset value and earnings value is also averaged with market value, the fallacy 
of the weighting method remains. If market value is to be considered, then weights should be 
assigned ouly to market value and to the higher of asset value and earnings value. This is because 
market value and the higher of asset value and earnings value may represent adequate, independ-
ent estimates of the true value of a corporation. The weights assigned would reflect the appraisers' 
relative confidence in each measure. See infra notes 196,213. A complete analysis of the validity 
of market value as an estimate of the value of a share in a subsidiary involved in a conflict-of· 
interest merger is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Brudney, Efficient Markets and 
Fair Shares in Parent Subsidia!J' Mergers, 4 J. CoRP. L. 63, 63-74 ( 1978); Note, A Reconsideration 
of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. RE.v. 
1023, 1036-44, 1048-54 (1976). There is good reason to believe that the market price will be de-
pressed if the ownership of a large percentage of sltares is concentrated in the hands of a control-
ling shareholder, making a freezeout possible. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 306. 
The depressed market price of shares bearing a risk of freezeout results, in part, because the 
holder bears a further risk that, should an appraisal be necessary, the weighting method will un-
dervalue the shares. 
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earnings value and asset value, rather than an average of the two. This 
is apparent from the definitions of the two estimates. 
Asset value is the amount for which the assets of the corporation, 
such as its plant and equipment, inventory, aild real estate, could be 
sold.30 The estimate ordinarily is based on the testimony of experts 
who rely on evidence such as the sale price of comparable assets.31 As-
sume that the fact:finder estimates that the asset value of Subsidiary 
Corporation is $60 million, or $60.00 per·share. 
Earnings value measures the ability of the corporation to generate 
earnings. In theory, the pattern of future annual earnings of the corpo-
ration is predicted. The predicted future earnings are then reduced to 
their present value by use of a discount rate which reflects both the time 
period before the earnings will be realized and the uncertainty as to 
what the actual earnings will be. 32 A short cut to this method is -often 
used in appraisals: an average of earnings for recent years is multiplied 
by a ·ratio called a ''multiplier," which reflects the relationship between 
market price and recent earnings for companies comparable to the cor-
poration being appraised.33 The choice of the multiplier has a large 
impact on the estimate of earnings value.34 Since a wi4e range of mul-
tipliers is justifiable, a wide range of estimates of earnings value is pos-
30. Liquidation value is based on considerations such as the units in which the assets would 
be sold and the length of time over which the sales would be made. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREL~ 
STEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 169-70 (2d ed. 1979). For a discussion of 
other considerations in measuring the asset value, see i'!fra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730, 736-37 (DeL Ch. 1978), ajj'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 413 A.2d 137, 146-47 (DeL 1980). 
32. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 30, at 35-44. The capital-asset pricing 
model, which is the basis of recent financial analysis, implies that the unsystematic portion of the 
riskiness of a corporation's predicted earnings-that which can be avoided by holding a diversi-
fied portfolio of securities-should be disregarded in selecting a discount rate. See J. VAN 
HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POUCY 29-69 (4th ed. 1977). 
33. See 1i!fra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
34. "The multiplier is likely to represent the point of greatest disparity between the contend-
ing parties because of the absence of objective criteria by which to measure it and because a very 
small variation will result in a significant difference in the final appraised value." Note, supra note 
28, at 1467. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 
1975) ("The choice of a multiplier is a most diJlicult task and one which is often the subject of 
parties' exceptions, since its use leads to an approximation of value for which creditable argu-
ments can always be made for increase or decrease."); Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 
460, 471 (DeL Cit. 1975) ("The selection of a multiplier in an appraisal action is always difficult 
and imprecise, as is the entire procedure of appraisal."). As with the assignment of weights, there 
may be a tendency for a decisionmaker to use the multiplier to make catch-all adjustments with-
out adequate explanation. See i'!fra note 205 and accompanying text. In Gibbons, 339 A.2d at 
468-71, the vice-chancellor removed the gain from the sale of a subsidiary from the .appraiser's 
estimate of earnings per share, but for that reason increased the appraiser's multiplier. Increasing 
the multiplier because of the sale of a subsidiary is unjustified and arbitrary. 
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sible. Assume that the earnings value per share of Subsidiary is 
estimated' to be $40.00. 
Weights ·which total 100% are then assigned to asset value and 
earnings value. In many jurisdictions, precedent plays an important 
role in establishing the range of percentages from which the weights 
will be chosen.35 Courts typically justify the selection of a particular 
weight by a brief reference to the special circumstances of the corpora-
tion being appraised. 36 Assume that the court assigns a weight of 40% 
to·asset value and 60% to earnings value. The appraised value under 
the conditions is represented in the following chart. 
Value Factor Value Weight Result 
--
Asset Value $60.00 40% $24.00 
Earnings Value $40.00 60% $24.00 
Appraised Value 
per Share $48.00 
The weighted average of asset value and earnings value results in 
an appraisal value somewhere between the two, closer to that value 
which receives the heavier weight.37 Here lies the fallacy. The value of 
35. See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 142-46 (Del. 1980). For a table 
listing weights used in selected cases, see Note, supra note 6, at 641. 
Delaware cases have been praised for the relative predictability of the weights used. Banks, 
supra note 28, at 34. The predictability is a small benefit, however, given the paucity of explana-
tion of how the weights are determined. Brudney, supra note 29, at 78. 
36. Summaries of the reasons offered by various courts in selecting weights are presented in 
Note, supra note 28, at 1469-71; Note, supra note 6, at 640-43. A case illustrating this reasoning is 
Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 287-89, "194 A.2d 50, 57-58 (Del. Ch. 1963), in 
which the following weights were assigned by the vice-chancellor: 
Earnings Value 
Asset Value 
Market Value 
Value per share 
$ 8.82 
35.67 
18.69 
Weight 
25% 
50% 
25% 
The resulting award was $24.71. The appraiser's weight of 60% for asset value was reduced by the 
court to 50% because no previous Delaware case had assigned a weight greater than 50% to the 
asset value. A weight as high as 50% was justified by the court on the ground that excess liquid 
ass$ were valued at $16.70 per share and other unneeded productive assets were valued at over 
$6.00 per share. The court's reasoning is deficient in a number of ways. If the asset value ex-
ceeded the earnings value, the award should have been equal to the'asset value. See infra notes 
47-64 and accompanying text. The estimate of the asset value in Levin was based on book value, 
Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. at 282-83, 194 A.2d at 54-55, and therefore was suspect. 
See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.· Moreover, the court should have considered 
whether a value even higher than asset value or earnings value could have been obtained by 
adding earnings value to the value of surplus assets. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying 
text. 
37. Taking a weighted average of two values is equivalent to determining a point on a line 
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the corporation should be equal to the higher of the two values, since 
that higher value represents the more profitable use of the corporation's 
resources. This may be called the best-use value of the corporation.38 
If the corporation's asset value is higher than its earnings value, the 
potential purchasers regard themselves as able to make a more 
profitable use of the assets than the corporation can, and the 
corporation should be liquidated. 39 On the other hand, when the 
earnings value is greater than the asset value, the corporation's 
management should continue operations, and the asset value becomes 
irrelevant. The fact that less money could be realized by liquidating 
the corporation than by continuing its operations is no more relevant 
than the existence of other inferior courses of action. To take a 
weighted average between the value of the corporation when its assets 
are employed in their best use and its value if they were employed in a 
less profitable course of action results in an undervaluation of the. 
corporation. 40 
In estimating the intrinsic value of a corporation, it should be 
assumed that a corporation's assets will be liquidated if and only if 
liquidation is more profitable than continued operation.41 The power 
to decide whether all or part of a corporation's assets should be 
liquidated is an important management responsibility. For most 
corporations, in most circumstances, the decision against total 
liquidation is easy and tacit.42 At times, however, especially when 
predicted earnings are low, the possibility that liquidation is the more 
profitable course for the corporation must be seriqusly considered. 
segment .by a combination of the segment's end points. Mathematically, any point on a line 
segment can be expressed by assigning the two end points of the segment weights which are 
greater than or equal to zero and which add up to one. K. LANCASTER, MATHEMATICAL 
ECONOMICS 261 (1968). 
38. In calculating asset value in Delaware, the concept of ''highest and best use," familiar 
from the law of eminent domain, is followed. Appraiser's Report at 5, Bell v. Kirby Lumber 
Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). The applicability of this concept to valuation of the corporation 
has been neglected. 
39. There is an exception to the statement in the text. Management might be delaying 
liquidation because it anticipates an increase in the asset value. See infra note 62 and 
accompanying lext 
40. For example, a corporation would probably be less profitable if its factories were shut 
down during the summer, but no one would think it sensible to evaluate the corporation by 
striking an average between its earnings value with the factories operating normally and its 
earnings value with the factories closed in the summer. 
41. See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text. 
42. A dividend can be viewed as a partial liquidation of the corporation. q: infra note 126 
and accompanying text (payment of dividends should depend on whether the corporation can 
make better use of the funds than its shareholders can). 
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This is a fundamental principle of the law of bankruptcy 
reorganization.43 The comparison of the liquidation value and 
earnings value remains important under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978.44 A plan for the reorganization and continued operation of a 
corporation cannot be confirmed over the objection of a claimant or 
interest holder who would receive less value under the plan than she 
would receive if the corporation were liquidated.45 
The weighting method always undervalues corporate stock. The 
particular inadequacies of the method, however, are best examined by 
looking to the three possible fact patterns in which the method would 
be applied. In the first two, asset value is respectively higher or lower 
than earnings value. In the third, slightly more complicated situation, 
the best use ofthe corporation's resources calls for a partial liquidation 
of the assets. The most obvious example of this situation occurs when 
the corporation has assets which are not being used in its operations. 
This is often true of a corporation in an appraisal proceeding because 
corporations with surplus assets are more likely than other corporations 
to end up in takeovers,46 which in turn are often followed by 
freezeouts. When a partial liquidation is called for, the best-use value 
of the corporation is the sum of the amounts which can be realized 
. from the sale of the assets that are the most valuable when liquidated 
and the amount which will be realized from continued operations with 
the remainder of the assets. In short, the value of surplus assets is 
added to the earnings value from continuing operations. 
43. See Blum, 17ze Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 565, 
588-93 (1950). 
44. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980). 
45. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A). 
46. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 5 (1973). ln 
one study for the years 1956 to 1967, 71.5% of the target companies had current ratios (current 
assets divided by current liabilities) higher than 2.25, which was considered to be the dividing line 
between normal and high liquidity. D. AUSTIN & J. FISHMAN, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT-
THE TENDER OFFER 14-16 (1970), cited in E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra, at 5-6. Another 
study concluded that the average quick ratio (cash plus cash equivalent items plus receivables, 
divided by the current liabilities) of target companies was significantly higher than that of a 
comparable control group of companies. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 
HAR.v. Bus. REv. 135-42 (1967). For an appraisal case acknowledging that surplus assets make a 
company an attractive target for a takeover, see Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 
465-66 & n.l (Del. Ch. 1975). In Gibbons, however, Vice-Chancellor Marvel did not recognize the 
significance of surplus assets to corporate appraisal. See i'!fra notes 120-59 and accompanying 
text In an earlier case, Vice-Chancellor Marvel also failed to recognize that when a company is 
regarded as an attractive target, the market price is normally less than the true value of a share. 
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 34 (Del. Ch. 1971). The Greene 
decision was limited by Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977), to cases in which 
the elimination of the minority stockholders was not the sole purpose of the "cash-out merger." 
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A. FACT PATTERN ONE: ASSET VALUE ESTIMATED To BE 
GREATER THAN EARNINGS VALUE 
This section describes the fallacy inherent in applying the weighting 
method in situations where asset value exceeds earnings value. The 
section also analyzes some recent cases in which asset value exceeded 
earnings value, yet the weighting method was applied. 
1. The Fa/lacy of Using the Weighti'!g Method in Fact Pattern One 
In the example above, earnings value for Subsidiary was estimated at 
$40 million and the asset value was estimated at $60 million. The two 
estimates imply that Subsidiary's operations should be terminated and 
its physical assets sold. Therefore, the appraisal value of $48 million 
that resulted from the weighting method is much too low. 
There are two possibilities when asset value is estimated to be 
greater than earnings value. Either the value estimates are in error or 
the company should at some time be liquidated. In either situation, 
valuation by weighting the estimates of asset value and earnings value 
will produce an incorrect result. 
a. Erroneous valuations: The failure to liquidate may be due to 
an overestimate of asset value or an underestimate of earnings value. 
When an inconsistency appears, both estimates should be checked. In 
our example, a factfinder, after review, might correct the estimate of 
asset value for Subsidiary to, say, $35 million. The earnings value 
would then exceed the asset value, the company should not be liqui-
dated, and the best-use value would be the earnings value of $40 
million. 
A possible source of error in the estimation of asset value is the use 
of a standard such as book value or reproduction cost rather than the 
price the assets would command on the open market. The book value 
of an asset has little to do With its economic value.47 Nevertheless, ap-
praisers in the past have used book value as the starting point for an 
estimate and then made various adjustments.48 Book values often un-
47. See_ e.g., J. VAN HoRNE, supra note 32, at 540, 640. "The net value of corporate assets 
reported on the balance sheet in accordance with accounting convention represents principally 
historical cost less book depreciation. ·Book value of property would be equal or even close to its 
actual current value only by sheer coincidence." In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, 
McNeill & Libby, 406 A2d 54, 66-67 (Me. 1979). 
48. See_ e.g., Francis L duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 350-51 
{Del. Ch. 1973), qff'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975) (calculating asset value by adding five special 
items to book value, but not discussing the accuracy ofbook value with regard to the other assets). 
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derstate the asset values in a period of inflation, but during a time of 
deflation, use of book value to measure asset value may cause estimates 
of asset value to exceed estimates of earnings value.49 
A few Delaware cases in which the estimate of asset value ex-
ceeded the estimate of earnings value50 may be explained by the fact 
that asset value was measured by reproduction cost less depreciation, a 
standard which has since been rejected in favor of theoretical liquida-
tion value.51 The reproduction cost of assets can never be less than 
their market value, but may be greater.52 When reproduction cost ex-
ceeds market value, it seems unreasonable that anyone would produce 
more assets of that kind, because to do so would be unprofitable. 53 
The apparent inconsistency may also arise from an underestimate 
of earnings value. Such an error is significant because it implies that 
the best-use value of the corporation is even higher than the best-use 
value indicated by the original estimates of asset value and earnings 
value. 54 Thus, if the factfinder concludes that the· estimate of Subsidi-
Use of book value in estimating asset value may be sound if each component of book value is 
considered and adjusted where necessary to reflect the market value of that asset, This approach 
was apparently followed in Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 256 (N.D. 1971). 
49. D. HERWITZ, BusiNESS PLANNING 24-25 (1966). For a postdepression example, see 
Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 278-79, 282, 287-88, 194 A.2d 50, 52, 54, 57 (Del. 
Ch. 1963) (productive assets, in a declining industry marked by closing of plants, had little value 
in liquidation, yet asset value per share was estimated at the book value of$35.67, of which $16.70 
was liquid; earnings value was estimated to be at $8.82). See also supra note 36 (discussing Levin 
in more detail). 
50. E.g., Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 83-84, 89, 159 A.2d 278, 281-84, 
286 (Del. Ch. 1960) (asset value per share estimated at $700.05; earnings value estimated at 
$365.23); Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 598, 98 A.2d 774, 777 (Del. Ch. 1953) 
(asset value per share estimated at $46.57; earnings value estimated at $11.97). With respect to the 
standard for asset value, these cases no longer express the current law. Poole v. N.V. Deli Maat-
schappij, 243 A.2d 67, 70-72 (Del. 1968). See i'!fra note 51. 
51. Poole v. N.v: Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67,72 (Del. 1968). In this suit for fraudulent 
misrepresentation in inducing the sale of stock, the court applied the weighting method, citing 
texts on valuation and emphasizing that the fair market value standard for assets is clearly de· 
fined, whereas "going-concern asset value [roughly equivalent to depreciated reproduction cost] is 
comparatively an ethereal concept." Id. 
52. Market value cannot exceed reproduction cost because a buyer would choose to 
reproduce the asset rather than pay a higher market price. (This statement assumes that reproduc-
tion cost includes the cost of delay while reproduction is taking place.) 
53. But see D. HERWITZ, supra note"49, at 14; Note, supra note 28, at 1458-59 (discussing the 
asset value of rental property). 
54. In one fraudulent misrepresentation case, a positive weight was assigned to an earnings 
value of$4.20 per share, although the asset value was $22.40 per share. Poole v. N.V. Deli Maat-
schappij, 243 A.2d 67, 73 (Del. 1968). In an offering letter the corporation had pointed out that its 
assets, land used to grow wrapper tobacco for cigars, had appreciated in value, but stated that the 
corporation did not necessarily believe that the land should be sold. It explained: ''Whether such 
action would be desirable will depend among other things upon the future course of events in the 
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ary's earnings value should be revised to $70 million, then the company 
should be kept operating and its best-use value is $70 million or $70.00 
per share. If management is properly continuing to operate the corpo-
ration, its business judgment must be that the best-use value of the cor-
poration exceeds current asset value, or asset value is expected to 
increase. 55 
Errors readily occur in estimations of earnings value, which in 
principle require the prediction of. future earnings and the translation 
of that prediction into a present value, whether through use of a multi-
plier or otherwise. In appraisal proceedings in Delaware, estimates of 
annual earnings are based on average reported earnings for the previ-
ous five years rather than on a prediction of future earnings. 56 If earn-
ings are expected to increase over their recent past average, the 
Delaware formula can lead to an underestimation of earnings value. 57 
An anticipated increase in earnings can be reflected in the multiplier, 
but only to the extent that the companies chosen as co~par.able have 
opportunities for earnings growth similar to those of the company be-
ing valued. 58 This would be true if the possible increase in earnings 
wrapper tobacco industry." Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 43 DeL Ch. 283, 288-89, 224 A.2d 
260, 263-64 (DeL 1966). This suggests that in fact earnings value might even have exceeded asset 
value. 
55. The point is often missed when a party argues that a given corporation should be valued 
at liquidation value. A court is likely to dismiss the argument on the ground that the corporation 
is a going concern. See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 362, 
364-65 (2d Cir. 1979). Yet continued operation of such a company only makes sense ifthe best-
use value is thought to be even higher than liquidation value. This point was missed in Seaboard 
World Airlines despite the recognition that the liquidation value represented a ''fallback" position 
if the operations planned by the acquiring corporation were unsuccessful. I d. at 364-65, 367. See 
infra notes 274-304 and accompanying text. As to the possibility that asset value may increase, see 
i'!fra note 62 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 
1975). Accounting earnings differ from the economic concept of earnings relevant to valuation. 
See]. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET-THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 143-44 (1973). 
See generally Blum & Katz, .Depreciation and Enterprise Valuation, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 236 (1965) 
(application of conventional depreciation formulas to assets which will be replaced in future years 
iguores the fact that replacement expenditures will be in future dollars, which are less valuable). 
Because of the discretion permitted by generally accepted accounting principles, identical compa-
nies could have widely different reported earnings. J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, supra, at 144-50. 
57. Butcf. J. LoRIE &M. HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 137-38, 142-67 (five year average may 
"normalize" earnings, especially for industries where earnings vary cyclically; predicting depar-
tures of corporate earnings from historical levels is difficult). 
58. An ad hoc adjustment of the mnltiplier might be made to refi.ect the possibility of 
growth. Cj, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218-22 
(DeL 1975) (use of the average price-earnings ratio ofnine other companies justified in part by the 
upward trend in corporation's earnings and by guaranteed increases in revenues from existing 
contracts). 
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stems from factors common to the industry, 59 but not if the possibility 
of greater earnings is peculiar to the merging company.60 A freezeout 
of minority shareholders may well occur at a time when management 
expects earnings to increase, perhaps on the basis of intuitive assess-
ments that are difficult to articulate.6 I With an appraisal technique 
based on past earnings, freezeouts at such a time will be more profita-
ble for insiders, and therefore more likely to occur than they would be 
with an appraisal technique based on future earnings. When earnings 
value has been erroneously estimated to be below asset value, the 
factfinder should correct the error and, if the revised estimate exceeds 
asset value, adopt the earnings value as the best-use value. 
b. Liquidation: If a review of the calculations confirms that the 
original estimates of asset value and earnings value are correct, then 
the value of the corporation can be maximized through liquidation. 
Management may have refrained from liquidating the company be-
cause it anticipates that the market price of assets will increase suffi-
ciently to justify delaying the sale. For example, the management of 
Subsidiary may think that the asset value of the corporation is likely to 
increase from $60 million to $65 million. If an increase in the asset 
value is expected,62 however, then the best-use value of Subsidiary is 
59. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 30, at 73-75. 
60. A company similar with respect to riskiness and growth of earnings is unlikely, however, 
to have a surplus asset position similar to that of the corporation being valued. Thus, surplus 
assets will not be reflected in an earnings value generated by the use of a multiplier. The per share 
value of surplus assets should instead be added to the earnings value of each share. See it!fra 
notes 126-34 and accompanying text. 
61. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 305-06. A case in which this may have 
occurred is Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 40, 342· A.2d 566, 568-69 (Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), in which a dramatic increase in earnings would have been reported for the six-
month period just before the proposed merger, if the insiders had not paid themselves large bo-
nuses. The court issued a preliminary injunction against the merger, remarking that "[T]he timing 
of the merger suggests that the insiders have chosen a most opportune time-in relation to 
Power/Mate's earnings record since it went public-to buy out the minority at an unreasonably 
low price." Id at 48, 342 A.2d at 573. q: in.fra note 87 (dramatic increase in asset value after a 
freezeout). 
62. If the market for a type of asset is efficient, however, the price will follow a random walk 
and will be as likely to go up as to go down. See Treynor, The Trouble with Earnings, FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 42, reprinted in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT MAN-
AGEMENT 612, 614 (J. Lorie & R. Brealey eds. 1978). The management of a corporation is likely 
to have expert knowledge about the industry, but it :p1ay not possess more expertise than other 
potential buyers and sellers of that type of asset. But cf. in.fra notes 84-92 and accompanying text 
(asset value at time of going-private tender offer found to exceed earnings value; company liqui-
dated six years later for an amount greatly exceeding the earlier estimate of asset value). 
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even greater than $60 million. 
Another possibility is that immediate liquidation is the best course 
of action for the corporation, and that management, hoping to profit at 
the expense of the outside shareholders, has failed to take this course of 
action.63 For example, assume that the best course for Subsidiary is 
liquidation, which would yield a best-use value.of$60 million or $60.00 
per share. Instead, management has frozen out the outside sharehold-
ers and dictated a payment of $50.00 per share. Once the outsiders are 
eliminated, management can then liquidate the company for its entire 
$60 million value. An appraisal process which arrived at the best-use 
value per share would eliminate this incentive to freezeout the minor-
ity. Because the weighting method consistently underestimates the 
value of the corporation, however, it tends to encourage the delay in 
liquidation. 64 
2. Recent Cases Illustrating Fact Pattern One 
In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. ,65 two Delaware courts affirmed the ap-
praiser's finding that asset value was $456.00 per share, and that earn-
ings value was $120.00 per share.66 A weight of 40% was assigned to 
asset value and a weight of 60% was assigned to earnings value, so that 
only $254.40 per share was awarded as the fair value of the shares. 67 
Given the estimates of asset value and earnings value, the award 
should have been $456.00 per share, 79% higher than the court's award. 
63. See infra notes 127, 219-24 and accompanying text. When failure to liquidate has been 
followed by a freezeout, the confiict of interest inherent in the freezeout places on management the 
burden of proving that its behavior was fair to the outsiders. Even under a business judgment 
standard, an unexplained, significant disparity between asset value and earnings value could result 
in liability for policies that could not reasonably be considered ln the best interests of the corpora-
tion. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 93, 97, 109-10, 112, 
121-26 (1979) (citing Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), ajf'd, 316 
A.2d 619 (DeL 1974); Thomas v. Kempner, No. 4138 (DeL Ch. Mar. 22, 1973)). But cf. Weiss, 
.Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 587-88 (1979) ("Directors' duty of due 
_care has almost been interpreted out of existence") (discussing Kamin v. American Express Co., 
·86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)). If management argued that its failure to 
liquidate was reasonable because earnings value was greater than asset value or because asset 
value was expected to increase, that argument would, of course, provide evidence that best-use 
value was greater than present asset value. See supra notes 54-55, 62 and accompanying text. 
64. q. infra note 224 and accompanying text (undervaluation by the weighting method cre-
ates an incentive for management temporarily to delay using the corporation's resources to the 
best advantage), note 248 and accompanying text (undervaluation by the weighting method may 
create an artificial and inefficient stimulus to tender offers). 
65. 413 A.2d 137 (DeL 1980), ajf'g 395 A.2d 730 (DeL Ch. 1978). 
66. 395 A.2d at 736-37, 739-40; 413 A.2d at 147-48. 
67. 413 A.2d at 146. 
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One of the reasons offered in Bell for using the weighting method 
was the assertion that management does not have the duty to maximize 
the value of the corporation. 68 This proposed justification is discussed 
and rejected in a later section of this Article.69 An investment banker, 
testifying as an expert for the defendant corporation, proposed a fur-
ther justification: minority stockholders. could use their award to buy 
into other corporations whose shares had depressed market prices. 
This argument was treated sympathetically by the appraiser, who said 
that the witness testified "accurately, I believe," and added: 
That seems fair enough, but there are unknown tax and transaction 
costs to be considered and there is also the recognition that the cor-
poration may have obtained a bargain at the expense of its stock-
holders .... Fortunately, I need not go extensively into this area 
because the present weighting of assets takes care of whatever dispar-
ity may exist [between market price and asset value].70 
Thus, the appraiser was apparently led by this argument to choose 
weights which resulted in a smaller award. The Delaware Supreme 
Court quoted the relevant passage of the appraiser's report, identifying 
it as partially explaining the selection of weights.71 The argument 
should have been rejected. Economic theory and empirical evidence 
refutes the proposition that bargains can be found in the securities mar-
ket.72 Furthermore, the argument pushes to an extreme the principle 
that a plaintiff must minimize damages 73 by assuming that the plaintiff 
must seek out bargain investments. It is also, as the appraiser noted, 
invalid to the extent that taxes and transactions costs would diminish 
the ability of outside shareholders to replace the common stock in 
Kirby Lumber Corporation with other investments.74 Another draw-
back is that a dissenter who purchased stock at a depressed price in 
another corporation would run the risk of similar mistreatment. This is 
most likely to happen if the other corporation is already controlled by a 
parent corporation that is able to freezeout minority shareholders. If, 
instead, the dissenter seeks a bargain in the shares of an independent 
corporation whose market price is below asset value, the risks are simi-
lar. The company may be mismanaged, in which case the chance of 
68. See id. at 140. 
69. See i'!fra notes 225-33 and accompanying text. 
70. Appraiser's Report at 38, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). 
71. 413 A.2d at 145. 
72. See, e.g., Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Tlzeol')', 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1614-17 
(1971). Bargains may develop after a security has been purchased, but a buyer cannot predict, at 
the time of purchase, which securities will become bargailis. I d. See i'!fra note 75. 
73. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, 186-90 (1973). 
74. Appraiser's Report at 38, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d at 142. 
1982] FALLACY OF WEIGHTING METHOJJ 1047 
receiving an adequate return from a purchase at the market price75 
would depend upon an improvement in management. One prospect 
for management improvement lies in the possibility that the corpora-
tion will become the target of a tender offer.76 A tender-offer price 
equal to the best-use value of the corporation is not likely, however, 
because such a price would not fully compensate the bidder for the 
costs and the risks of the offer.77 Thus, even assuming that bargains are 
available in the securities markets, a freezeout at a price below best-use 
value or a tender offer followed by a freezeout at a price below best-use 
value· will likely await a dissenter seeking a bargain in another corpora-
tion with a depressed market price. The risk of such an occurrence is in 
part created by an appraisal remedy which awards less than the true 
value of a share. 
The outsiders in Bell argued that because a natural resource com-
pany presents special valuation problems, their shares should be ap-
praised at the price which would be paid by an unrelated corporation 
in an arms-length merger, rather than be appraised by the weighting 
method.78 The refusal of the appraiser to adopt the suggested standard 
was affirmed on the ground that there was no precedent for departing 
from the general appraisal rules because of the nature of the corpora-
tion. 79 The court added: 
[A]n arm's-length merger presupposes an acquisition value based 
upon the very fact that the company will not continue in business on 
the same basis that existed immediately prior to the merger. It in-
troduces another element, namely, the value another would place 
upon it as a price for merger as opEosed to the corporation's in-
dependent value as a going concern. 8 
75. The suggestion"that outsiders could find bargain investments elsewhere to make up for a 
loss incurred in the freezeout is inconsistent with the semistrong form of the efficient market hy-
pothesis, which hol<Js that market prices fully retlect public knowledge about the prospective re-
turns from holding a stock. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 71. F<>r·a summary 
of evidence supporting the semistrong form of the efficient market hypothesis, see id. at 83-87. 
76. A takeover bidder would hope either to realize the asset value through liquidation or to 
achieve an earnings value which is even higher than asset value. See i'!fra notes 236-41 and 
accompanying text. 
77. See i'!fra notes 242-45 and accompanying text. 
78. 395 A.2d at 735-36. 
79. Id. at 735; 413 A.2d at 142. One commentator favors the outsiders' contention that an 
exception should be made for appraisals of natural resources companies, giving asset value a 
higher weight. Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.: Ascertaining "Fair Value" Under the Dela-
ware Appraisal Statute, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 426, 438-40, 439 n.95 (1981). The commentator does 
not recognize that persistent refusal to liquidate a corporation with a high asset value makes sense 
only when the going-concern value is even greater than asset value. Instead, the investor is re-
garded by the commentator as seeking either asset value or earnings value. See id. at 429-30, 438-
39, 439 n.95. A rational investor seeks the larger value, whatever it is. 
80. 395 A.2d at 736 (emphasis in original). 
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The court's remarks are paradoxical; the court does not explain how 
the corporation's value can be less than the "third-party price," the 
price a willing buyer would pay for it. If the controlling shareholders 
are not selling the corporation at the third-party price, they must be 
placing an even higher value on it.81 
In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. , 82. a recent case dealing with the 
application of the weighting method to a corporation whose asset value 
exceeded its earnings value, the Delaware Supreme Court criticized the 
result but failed to identify the fallacy in the weighting method. In an 
earlier opinion in that case, 83 the court had held that a parent corpora-
tion had breached its fiduciary duty to outside shareholders of its sub-
sidiary by making a tender offer at $12.00 per share without disclosing 
two material facts. 84 On the first remand, the chancellor valued the 
shares of the subsidiary in order to determine the appropriate remedy 
for the breach of fiduciary duty.85 He adopted the weighting method, 
analogizing the proceeding to an appraisal hearing after a merger.86 
Although he concluded that net asset value per share was $17.50, he 
combined this with a market value of $9.48, and an earnings value of 
$5.25, to obtain a weighted average of $11.85 per share at the date of 
the tender offer. Accordingly, the chancellor concluded that the 
outside shareholders had not been injured by the failure to disclose the 
material facts, since the tender offer had been $12.00 per share.87 
81. But see Chazen, Faimessftom a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Compa-
nies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW 1439, 1467-72 (1981) 
(arguing that the price paid in a negotiated transaction by controlling shareholders, where the 
outsiders arc represented by a committee of outside directors or other negotiators, might properly 
be less than the third-party price, which may be regarded as payment for both control and non-
control shares). Chazen's argument relics in part on the proposition that a company might be 
worth more to a third party than to a controlling shareholder, who can nevertheless block a sale of 
the whole company by refusing to sell his shares. The proposition is unsound, however, because a 
controlling shareholder's refusal to sell at the third-party price provides strong evidence that the 
company is worth even more to him than to the third-party. 
82. 429 A.2d 497 (DeL 1981), modf/Ying 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979). 
83. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). 
84. Id at 281-82. 
85. 402 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. Ch. 1979), mod!fied, 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981 ). 
86. Id at 11-12. 
87. Id at 12. The tender offer was made in September 1974. In June 1980, potentially 
enormous discoveries of gas were made in an area where the subsidiary owned considerable prop-
erty. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1980, at 2, col. 2. In August 1980, after having obtained bids from 
several large corporations, the ultimate parent entered into a tax-free transaction whereby it re-
ceived $60.00 for each share of the subsidiary, plus 10% of the profits from the new discoveries of 
gas, after the deduction of certain startup costs. In addition, the subsidiary's debt to the ultimate 
parent of approximately $25 million was to be paid. Id The president and chief executive officer 
of the parent explained that the transaction resulted from an evaluation by management of the 
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The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that damages 
should have been based on the value of the subsidiary at the date of 
trial rather than at the date of the tender offer.88 Although the opinion 
is ambiguous,89 the court apparently did not object to the use of the 
weighting method.90 In addition to holding that the chancellor's valua-
tion of the corporation was too low,91 the court did suggest, however, 
that the weight assigned to asset value had been too low in comparison 
to the weight assigned to market value: 
[T]he value which the Chancellor fixed was influenced significantly 
by the percentage which he assigned to assets in the formula he used. 
It seems to us that assigning the same factor (40%) to both asset value 
and market value was highly questionable. We say this because oil 
was (and is) a limited and much needed energy source which signifi-
cantly affected its value as a corporate asset; in contrast, [the parent's] 
dominance of [the subsidiary] and its announced plan to acquire all 
of[the subsidiary's] stock undoubtedly had an influence on the value 
assigned by the market to the shares traded.92 
Although the court was fully justified in distrusting the assignment of 
asset values of all parts of the parent's businesses. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1980, at D2, 5-6. The 
excess in the value received in 1980 over the vice-chancellor's weighted value of $11.85 and his 
estimate of$17.50 for asset value was surely due in part to the increase in energy prices after 1974, 
the value of the new discoveries, and a control premium. 
88. 429 A.2d at 503. Valuing the subsidiary's stock at a later date probably led to a higher 
valuation, since energy prices had increased. See supra note 87. This increase, however, was not 
an appropriate means of correcting the undervaluation which the supreme court apparently per-
ceived. A conflict-of-interest transaction may be based on inside information or superior intuition 
indicating that the subsidiary's performance will improve, see supra note 61 and accompanying 
text, and the improvement may later become obvious. This apparently had not happened by the 
date of the earlier trial in Lynch. The court suggested that measurement as of the date of the 
tender offer would result in the omission from valuation of any gains from the transaction. 429 
A2d at 501. In Lynch, however, the subsidiary continued to be operated separately, so synergistic 
gains were implausible. Jn any event, using the date of the earlier trial, which was determined by 
events unrelated to valuation issues, would not lead to an appropriate correction of the valuation 
amount. The co~rt suggested that the 1978 date of the earlier trial was a·reasonable compromise 
between the date on which the shares were sold in 1974 and the expected date of the next trial in 
1981. /d at 505. Without a good reason for measuring value at the latter date, however, the 
compromise lacks justification. · 
89. The court stated that, ''reversal is required because the chancellor erroneously relied on 
the Poole case and on an appraisal formula (which has been developed in our case Ia w under the 
[appraisal] Statute, 8 JJel C § 262)." 429 A.2d at 500. The court's recognition of error in relying 
on Poole, however, may have been only in reference to the date at which damages were to be 
measured. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
90. See i'!fra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
91. The court held that the stock should be valued at least at $15.00, which is the price that 
the parent had been willing to pay to third parties on the open market, on the ground that the 
parent should have been at least as generous to outside shareholders, to whom a fiduciary duty 
was owed, as it was to strangers. ld at 505. 
92. ld 
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weights in Lynch, it did not correctly analyze the chancellor's errors. 
The court was probably right in concluding that the parent's control of 
the subsidiary and the announcement of its plans influenced the market 
price. In particular, the market price was probably below the true 
value of a share.93 . It is unsound, however, to assign any weight to a 
measure of value which is thought to underestimate the true value, un-
less an attempt is mad.e to correct the underestimation.94 The court 
also erred in asserting that the relative weighting of the asset value was 
too low because "oil was (and is) a limited and much needed energy 
source .... "An asset worth $100.00 consisting of a valuable energy 
source is no more valuable-and no more worthy of a greater weight-
than an asset consisting of $100 worth of recyclable wastepaper, just as 
one hundred pounds of lead weighs no more than one hundred pounds 
of feathers. The relative weighting of asset value was too low only be-
cause a positive weight was assigned to earnings value. The earnings 
value was smaller than asset v.alue and was therefore irrelevant. Thus 
the disquiet of the court produced by the use of-the weighting method 
in Lynch was not translated into any useful insight about the fallacious-
. ness of the method itself.95 
B. FACT PATTERN Two: EARNINGS VALUE ESTIMATED To BE 
GREATER THAN ASSET VALUE AND THERE ARE No 
SURPLUS ASSETS 
This section describes the fallacy inherent in applying the weighting 
method in situations where earnings value exceeds asset value and 
there are no surplus assets. The section also analyzes a recent case in 
which earnings value exceeded asset value, there were no surplus as-
sets, and the weighting method was applied. 
1. The Fallacy of Using tize Weighting Method ln Fact Pattern Two 
Assume that in the previous hypothetical, Subsidiary's earnings value is 
estimated to be $70 million and that its asset value is found to be $40 
million. Earnings value then exceeds asset value. This is the expected 
93. See supra note 29. 
94. C.f. Morris, Combining Expert Judgments: A Bayesian Approach, 23 MoMT. Scr. 679, 
682-83 (1977) ("calibration" of expert's prediction in light of the types of errors in her previous 
predictions). Here, market value as an estimator of true value should be "calibrated" in accord 
with theoretical and empirical consiqerations which suggest that it tends to underestimate true 
value. 
95. C.f. l'!fra notes 322-23 and accompanying text (importance of identifying the fallacy in 
assigning a positive weight to the lower of asset value and earnings value, rather than simply 
increasing the relative weight of best-use value). 
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relationship for a corporation whose operations are ongoing. Asset 
value represents what others could realize from the separate physical 
assets of the corporation. It excludes from consideration most of the 
characteristics that make the ongoing corporation a significant entity:96 
the synergism of operating the physical assets together; the human cap-
ital of a skilled labor force and an established organization;97 and such 
intangible assets as ideas, reputation, and the image created by 
advertising.98 
If the weighting method is applied with the same weights as were 
used before, the appraisal value is as follows: 
Value Factor 
Asset Value 
Earnings Value 
Value 
$40.00 
$70.00 
Weight 
40% 
60% 
Appraised Value 
Result 
$10.00 
$42.00 
per Share $58.00 
The best-use value of the corporation, however, is $70.00 per share. 
Assigning a weight to asset value reduces the appraised value below the 
best-use value. The amount of the reduction depends on the amount of 
synergism, skill, and intangible assets present, i.e., on the value 
generated by the cooperative effort of all the assets of the corporation. 
It might be argued that assigning a weight to asset value accounts 
for the possibility that the corporation's earnings will be 
disappointingly low and that liquidation at the lower asset value will 
occur.99 Earnings value, however, should already reflect the possibility 
of untoward circumstances; the estimate of future annual earnings 
96. "[ToJ confine the appraisal to the strictly asset basis [leaves] out of account all the ele-
ments which contribute to value as incidental to a going enterprise." Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 
Del. Ch. 142, ISO, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del Ch. 1934). 
91. See Prescott & Visscher, Organization Capital, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 446 (1980) (firms acquire 
capital in the form of knowledge of their personnel and coordination of workers into effective 
teams, and acquire human capital in the form of on-the-job training in techniques used only in a 
specific firm). On human capital generally, see G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975). For 
applications of the theory of human capital to common law issues, see Harrison, Wrong/ill Dis-
charge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207,222-32,239-40,242 (1981); P. Rubin & 
P. Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete (unpublished paper) (presented at the 
Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association, in Washington, D.C., November 
6, 1980) (copies on ffie with the Economics Department, University of Georgia and with Southern • 
Ca/ffomia Law Review). 
98. For a survey of the theoretical and empirical debates about the value of advertising 
capital, see Comanor & Wilson, The Effect of Advertising on Competition: A Survey, 17 J. EcoN. 
LITERATURE 453, 453-67 (1979). 
99. For discussion of a similar argument, see infta notes 206-16 and accompanying text. 
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should be a weighted average of both good and bad possibilities, and 
the discount rate should include a risk premium reflecting the risk that 
the corporation will do badly. 100 An estimate of earnings value which 
inadequately reflects the probability that earnings will be poor should 
obviously be corrected. Only through an extreme coincidence would 
any needed correction in the earnings value correspond to the 
reduction in the appraisal value which results from assigning a weight 
to asset value. 
Indeed, asset value in some circumstances may serve as a fallback 
position or "abandonment value" which sets a floor on the extent to 
which a possible decline in earnings can affect the best-use value of the 
corporation. 101 It can be anticipated that the worst possible financial 
outcome will be avoided by liquidating the corporation as soon as it 
appears that disastrously low earnings are likely to persist. 102 If the 
estimate of earnings value refl~cts the fact that the worst case 
possibilities for earnings will never be experienced, the estimate of 
earnings value will be increased and so also will the estimate of best-
use value. Thus, the presence of assets which could be sold can 
increase best-use value in some circumstances, but never diminish it. 
The weighting method ignores this principle and instead reduces 
appraised value in proportion to the extent that asset value falls short 
of earnings value. 
Consider, for example, a corporation with a novel marketing 
strategy, whose success is uncertain. Suppose for simplicity that the 
operating results of a new management will be known within one year 
to be very bad, satisfactory, or very good, and that those results will 
persist forever. Suppose, again for simplicity, that all other uncertainty 
about the corporation's eat:niDgs can be ignored. Specifically, let the 
corporation's probability distribution of earnings be: 
100. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,supra note 30, at 52-70; Schaefer, Uncertainty and 
the Law of lJamages, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 719-24 (1978). 
101. See J. VAN HoRNE, supra note 32, at 144-49. For recognition that the liquidation value 
of assets provides a faJlback if planned operations are unsuccessful, see Seaboard World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Tiger lnt'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 364-65, 367 (2d Cir. 1979). 
102. The prediction of future earnings on which an estimate of earnings value is based may 
always be revised in light of the company's experience. Earnings below the predicted value in one 
year may be due simply to bad luck, but they also may cast some doubt on the prediction. C.f. M. 
Schaefer & E. Schaefer, A Bayesian Approach to Bankruptcy Reorganization 5-6, (unpublished 
paper) (presented at the Joint Meeting of The Institute for Management Science and the 
Operations Researclt Society of America in New York City, May 3, 1978) (copy on file with 
Southern Calffomia Law Review). 
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Earnings Probability 
$300,000 Y.3 
$600,000 Y.3 
$900,000 Y.3 
Expected Value of 
Earnings 
Weighted Value 
$100,000 
$200,000 
$300,000 
$600,000 
Because in this example all the uncertainty will disappear after 
one year, a virtually risk-free discount rate would be appropriate in 
valuing the company after that time. Assume that the discount rate is 
8¥.1%. The probability distribution of the corporation's value one year 
from now is: 
Earnings Value One Year From Now 
$300,000 per year forever, discounted at 8Y.3% 
$3,600,000 
$600,000 per year forever, discounted at 8Y.3% 
$7,200,000 
$900,000 per year forever, discounted at 8Y.3% 
Probability Weighted Value 
Y.3 $1,200,000 
$2,400,000 
$10,800,000 Y.3 $3,600,000 
Expected value of Corporation in I year: $7,200,000 
Thus, the expected earnings value of the corporation one year from 
now is $7,200,000. To obtain the present value of the corporation, this 
figure is discounted for the waiting period of one year and for the high 
uncertainty presently surrounding the corporation's prospects: there is 
a one-third chance that the earnings value one year from now will be 
well below $7,200,000. If a discount rate of 15% were used to reflect 
this risk, the corporation's present value would be roughly 
$6,260.000. 103 
Suppose, however, that the physical assets of the company can 
always be sold for $4,500,000, even if the company's marketing strategy 
is a total failure. 104 The corporation will choose to realize this 
"abandonment value" if the earnings value of the corporation falls 
below $4,500.000. If the new marketing strategy is unsuccessful, and 
103. The value of$1.00 to be received in one year, discounted at 15% is $1 + 1.15, or roughly 
$0.87. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 30, at 38. The present value of $7,200,000 is 
thus 1 + 1.15 X $7,200,000, or $6,260,000. 
104. The floor on best-use value provided by asset value may be a moving floor if the 
disappointing earnings are the result of an industry-wide depression which reduces the value of 
the assets. For example, if the earnings value fell to $3,600,000 because of reduced demand for the 
goods produced by the firm's assets, the asset value would probably be lower than $4,500,000. 
This possibility would complicate, but not fundamentally alter, the analysis. 
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the earnings value of the corporation is only $3,600,000, management 
will instead choose to sell the physical assets for $4,500,000. With this 
option, the probability distribution of the value of the corporation is 
more favorable than before: 
Value One Year from Now 
$4,500,000 from sale of assets 
Probability Weighted Value 
$600,000 per year forever, discounted at 8Y3% = 
$7,200,000 
$900,000 per year forever, discounted at 8Y3% = 
$10,800,000 
Y3 $1,500,000 
Y3 $2,400,000 
Y3 $3,600,000 
$7,500,000 
Because the higher asset value can be realized when earnings value is 
disastrously low, the expected value of the corporation one year from 
now is higher, i.e., $7,500,000. Moreover, the riskiness of holding the 
corporation's stock for one year has been reduced, since the worst 
possible outcome is $4,500,000 rather than $3,600,000. Therefore, a 
lower risk premium is appropriate. With a discount rate of 13%, the 
present value of the corporation would be roughly $6,640,000.105 Thus, 
the presence of physical assets which can be sold if the corporation's 
earnings are too low diminishes the riskiness and increases the best-use 
value of the corporation.106 These factors, however, are fully reflected 
in a proper estimation of the earnings value and no correction through 
a weighted asset value is necessary. 
2. · A Recent Case -Illustrating Fact Pattern Two 
Until recently, estimates of asset value have exceeded earnings value in 
most appraisal cases. 107 Application of the weighting method in these 
cases without consideration of the implications of the relative magni-
tudes of asset value and earnings value made it likely that courts would 
also apply the method when asset value was less than earnings value. 108 
A Delaware court has now done so. In Universal City Studios v. Francis 
I. duPont & Co., 109 the estimated earnings value of $92.89 was assigned 
105. The present value of$1.00 to be received one year from now, discounted at a rate of 13%, 
is $1 + 1.13. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTElN,supra note 30, at 37. The present value, therefore, 
can be found by dividing $7,500,000 by 1.13. 
106. When abandonment value is taken into accoun~ best-use value resembles a hybrid of 
earnings value and asset value, and recognizes that the higher of those two options can always be 
chosen. 
107. See i'!(ra note 197 and accompanying text. 
108. Id 
109. 312 A.2d 344 (Del Ch. 1973), qfjd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975). 
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a weight of87.5%, and the estimated asset value of$91.72 was assigned 
a weight of 12.5%, yielding an appraised value of $92.75 per share.110 
If the two estimates were correct, then the best-use value of the corpo-
ration was its earnings value of$92.89. Assigning a weight ofless than 
100% to earnings value resulted in an appraised value that was $0.14 
less than the best-use value. The difference in this case was relatively 
small because asset value was almost as great as earnings value and 
because a weight of only 12.5% was assigned to asset value. Neverthe-
less, application of the weighting method when earnings value is 
greater than asset value has the potential for significant underestima-
tion of the value of the corporation. The conventional range of weights 
for asset value is well above 12.5%, m and an operating company's asset 
value is often well below its earnings value. 
Universal City Studios also illustrates how drawing a fine distinc-
tion between asset value and earnings value further ensures that ap-
praisal value will be less than best-use value. The dissenting 
shareholders argned that the corporation's right to obtain revenues 
from theatrical showings of its fully amortized films represented an as-
set which should be valued on the basis of predicted future earnings, by 
the capitalization of the revenue generated by the films in the previous 
year. 112 The court rejected this contention on the basis of Delaware 
precedent requiring that the earning power of individual assets be 
taken into account only through the weight assigned to earnings 
value. 113 The films were assigned an asset value on the basis of the 
o only evidence of their market value in the record, a figure much less 
than their earnings would apparently have justified. 114 
Conceptually, the court's holding has some merit: if one is valuing 
assets and earnings separately and then averaging those values, the sep-
arate categories become confused if earnings predictions are permitted 
110. 312 A.2d at 352. 
111. See infra note 212. 
112. 312 A.2d at 351. Cf. Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 732, 387 
N.E.2d 1145, 1152 (1979) (''The fact that earnings from concessions were included in the computa-
tion of earnings value, one component in the formula, does not mean that the value of the conces-
sions should have been excluded from the computation of net asset value, another such 
component."); In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 292 n.7, 304 A.2d 694, 698 n.7 (1973) (defining 
net asset value to include "good will and the corporation's value as a going concern"). 
113. 312 A.2d at 351, qfjd, 334 A.2d at 222. Inconsistently, the court allowed future television 
revenues to be considered in determining asset value. 312 A.2d at 350. See infra text accompany-
ing note 116. 
114. The court found that the films were worth $0.65 per share. The dissenters contended that 
the present value of future theatrical revenue from the films was $32.17 per share. 312 A.2d at 
350-51. 
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to influence both asset value and earnings value. As a practical matter, 
however, this reasoning has two drawbacks. First, the market value of 
assets cannot be neatly separated from their earning power. Evidence 
of the earnings the films could generate was evidence upon which to 
base an opinion about market value. 115 Indeed, the market value of the 
films could not plausibly be estimated to be less than their earnings 
value. Moreover, since films are not fungible, the evidence of market 
value accepted by the court was probably based indirectly on evidence 
about earnings. For example, if the evidence of market value w:as 
based on sale prices of comparable films, it is highly likely that in judg-
ing them to be comparable, consideration was given to relative earning 
power. The court implicitly recognized the role of earnings in valuing 
assets when it accepted the agreement of both parties that the present 
value of future estimated television revenues should be included in as-
set value. 116 
Second, use of earnings power to value assets can correct, in a 
clumsy way, some of the underestimation of corporate value which 
would otherwise result from applying the weighting method when 
earnings value exceeds asset value. If asset value more closely approxi-
mates earnings value, when earnings value is the best-use value for a 
corporation, the error created by striking an average between the two 
values is reduced. Capitalizing earnings from a portion of the corpora-
tion's business, such as the sale of television rights to old movies, and 
treating those rights as an asset may seem artificial, but might lead to a • 
weighted average closer to best-use value. Moreover, the description of 
a valuable right of the corporation as an asset is consistent with famil-
iar conceptions of an asset. 117 Piecemeal valuation of individual assets 
whose earning power can be isolated is of course a poor way to try to 
capture the earnings value of an entire corporation, which entails an 
estimation of the effect of combining all of a corporation's assets with 
its labor force and administrative organization. 118 So long as the 
weighting method is applied, however, using the earning power of each 
asset in calculating the value of that asset tends to result in a truer 
estimate of actual value than would otherwise be obtained, although 
the result would remain inferior to that obtainable by best-use 
115. See, e.g., D. DoBBS, mpra note 73, at 146-47, 391. 
116. 312 A.2d at 350-51. 
117. See, e.g., W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 3 (1978) ("Every investment can be conceived ns an 
asset held by someone: the prospeet of future returns."). 
118. See mpra notes 96-98 and accompanying text 
1982] FALLACY OF WEIGHTING METHOD 1057 
valuation. 119 
The correct result will be achieved if courts would recognize that 
asset value should sometimes be disregarded in determining intrinsic 
value, i.e., when it is less than earnings value and there are no surplus 
assets. In Gibbons v. Schenley Industries~ Inc. , 120 the court assigned a 
zero weight to asset value, 121 but this was inappropriate. Vice-Chancel-
lor Marvel relied on a leading work on securities analysis for the prop-
osition that the market price of a share depends chiefly on the earnings 
power of a corporation, and that asset value is largely irrelevant. 122 
This proposition was inapplicable in Gibbons for two reasons: the esti-
mate of asset value exceeded the estimate of earnings value, and the 
value of surplus assets was significant. 123 
Whether the Gibbons suggestion that asset value should usually be 
ignored will eventually lead to a correct analysis of the relationship 
between asset value and earnings value is uncertain. So far, its influ-
ence has not been promising: Gibbons was treated in .Bell v. Kirby Lum-
ber Corp. 124 as precedent for reducing the weight assigned to asset 
value, even though in .Bell asset value greatly exceeded earnings 
value. 125 
C. FACT PATIERN THREE: EARNINGS VALUE ESTIMATED To BE 
GREATER THAN ASSET VALUE BUT THERE ARE 
SURPLUS ASSETS 
This section discusses the fallacy inherent in applying the weighting 
method when earnings value exceeds asset value but there are surplus 
assets. The section concludes with an analysis of recent cases in which 
119. Like the manipulation of weights, the ad hoc device described in the text risks confusion 
and may delay abandonment of the weighting method. See i'!fra note 323 and accompanying text. 
120. 339 A.2d 460 (Del Ch. 1975). 
121. Id at 472-73. 
122. Id at 473, citing B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTILE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 217 (4th ed. 
1962). 
123. See i'!fra notes 137-59 and accompanying text. 
124. 413 A.2d 137, 142-46 (Del. 1980). 
125. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Gibbons was quoted with approval in In 
re Valuation of Co=on Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 66 (Me. 1979), which 
held that the appraiser's weight of20% for asset value was "if anything, on the high side." Id at 
67. The court pointed out that the appraiser's estimate of asset value was based on book value, 
which ''would be equal or even close to ..• actual current value only by sheer coincidence." Id 
The unreliable estimate of asset value, however, greatly exceeded that of the earnings value. I d at 
59. The court did not discuss the possibility that a correct measure of asset value would also have 
exceeded earnings value. 
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earnings value exceeded asset value, surplus assets were present, and 
the weighting method was applied. 
1. The Fallacy of Using the Weighting Method in Fact Pattern Three 
Even if the corporation's earnings value exceeds the value of all its as-
~ets so that its operations should be continued, it may still have some 
assets whose value in contributing to earnings is less than their value if 
they were sold or distributed to the shareholders. Easiest to identify are 
assets which make no contribution at all to earnings. Suppose that 
Subsidiary is found to have an earnings value of $70 million and an 
asset value of $40 million. Best-use value is then at least $70 million, or 
$70.00 per share. Assume further, however, that Subsidiary has $5 mil-
lion in cash above the amount which is needed for working capital in 
continuing operations. That cash could be distributed to the sharehold-
ers with no diminution in the earnings value of the corporation. Thus, 
the best-use value of the corporation should be estimated to be $75 
million, or $75.00 per share. This amount, which may be termed sur-
plus-asset-plus-earnings-value, is greater than either asset value or 
earnings value, and will always be greater than any weighted average 
of the two. Surplus~asset~plus~earnings~value assumes that all of a cor-
poration's assets should be put to their best use: surplus assets should 
be liquidated~ those which are more valuable in continuing operations 
should be used to generate earnings. 
Surplus assets usually indicate an incorrect investment policy. As-
sets which are earning a smaller return for the corporation than the 
shareholders could obtain for themselves should be distributed in some 
form to the shareholders. 126 Management and controlling shareholders 
should invest the assets of the corporation productively and pay divi-
dends when no such investments can be found. 127 
A challenge by shareholders to unproductive policies of a continu-
ing corporation would typically come in the form of an allegation of 
126. See Brudney, .Dividends, .Discretion, and .Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REv. 85, 86-87 (1980). 
One branch of the financial theory of dividends holds that dividends sometimes enhance the mar-
ket value of shares even when the corporation could make more productive use of the funds than 
could its shareholders. See id at 87-99. For a persuasive recent argument to this effect, see Bhat· 
tacharya, Imperfectl'!formation, dividend policy and "the blrd in the hand" fallacy, 10 BELL J. 
EcoN. 259 (1979). If this aspect of the theory of dividends is accepted, the statement in the text 
follows a fortiori. 
127. See Brudney, supra note 126, at 100-03. Directors and officers owe the corporation a 
duty of due care in the management of its affairs, H. HENN, supra note 1, at 453-55, which must 
include due care to use its resources productively. Cf. supra note 63 (potential liability when 
failure to liquidate corporation violates duty of due care). 
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underpayment of dividends. Such an attack is difficult to mount. The 
information needed to assess investment policy is in the control of 
management and is difficult to discover because it involves judgments 
about future earnings possibilities. 128 If an attack is mounted, it is not 
likely to succeed. Controlling shareholders of a continuing corporation 
are regarded as having no conflict of interest as long as all shareholders 
are treated alike, and the controlling shareholders bear a pro rata share 
of any sacrifice in earnings occasioned by an unproductive investment 
policy. 129 Relying on the business judgment rule, a court is unlikely to 
find that the failure to reinvest promptly assets which yield little benefit 
to the corporation is an abuse of the discretion granted to 
management.130 
It should be easier to challenge investment policies in an appraisal 
following a freezeout than in a suit seeking payment of dividends. Al-
though it may be difficult to obtain sufficient evidence of the inner 
workings of the firm through discovery, 131 a dissenter will often receive 
valuable information from the disclosures made by management as it 
executes a freezeout. 132 Moreover, the corporation's past policies will 
no longer be tested by the business judgment rule. In freezeout merg-
ers, a conflict of interest exists because the inside shareholders are 
treated differently from the outside shareholders. If corporations were 
valued on the basis of suboptimal previous policies, insiders would 
have an incentive to increase their profit by failing to make the maxi-
mum use of resources and therefore temporarily depressing corporate 
earnings. 133 Management, therefore, should have the burden of prov-
ing in an appraisal proceeding that there are no gains to be realized 
from better use of the corporation's assets.134 
128. See Brudney, supra note 126, at 116-17. 
129. See id. at 100 n.46, 104. Brudney argues that courts will avoid finding a conflict of 
interest, perhaps because of the difficulty of determining the correctness of a dividend policy. I d. 
at 104-05, 126-27 n.l22. 
130. See H. HENN, supra note 1, at 665-69. Judicial reluctance to find a violation may stem 
from the difficulty of the factual judgments involved and the uncertainty of the standards which 
should govern the payment of dividends. See Brudney, supra note 126, at 104-05. 
131. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 75-76. 
132. For an illustration of this situation, see infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text. 
133. Continuing to operate a corporation when asset value exceeds earnings value is a special 
case of failure to maximize the value of a corporation. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying 
text; infra note 219 and accompanying text. The market price of the shares of a corporation that 
should liquidate but is continuing to operate will probably be substantially less than the asset 
value. Market prices have been known to double or triple when companies have announced in-
tentions to liquidate. Sloan, Beware the Sugar Bubble, FORBES; April 28, 1980, at 73. 
134. Cf. Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 351 (DeL Ch. 
1973), qff'd, 334 A.2d 216 (DeL 1975) (because of fiduciary duty, parent corporation had burden in 
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2. Recent Cases Illustrating Fact Pattern Three 
A brief analysis of recent cases in which there were surplus assets illus-
trates how the use of the weighting method undervalues corporate stock 
under these conditions. As discussed above, 135 in Gibbons v. Schenley 
Industries, Inc., 136 the court assigned a weight of zero to asset value. 
The assignment was incorrect for two reasons. First, the court's esti-
mate of earnings value per share was less than the appraiser's estimate 
of asset value per share. 137 A court should not accept an estimate of 
earnings value which is less than that of the asset value without deter-
mining whether the earnings value estimate is too low, whether the as-
set value estimate is too high, or whether the corporation should be 
liquidated. 138 
Second, Schenley Industries, the company whose stock was being 
appraised in Gibbons, had surplus assets. A correct analysis would 
have added the value of the surplus assets to the earnings value of the 
corporation and compared that sum, the surplus-asset-plus-earnings-
value, with the asset value of the company. 139 Schenley's ownership of 
a large amount of surplus cash was judicially acknowledged nearly 
three years after Gibbons in Cole v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 140 a case 
that involved alleged violations of federal securities law during the 
freezeout. 
In Cole, the minority shareholders alleged that the proxy state-
ment for the merger failed to disclose adequately the amount of liquid 
assets unnecessary for Schenley's operations and the amounts of cash 
which Schenley would transfer to its parent, Glen Alden, after the 
merger of Schenley with a wholly-owned subsidiary of Glen Alden. 
The proxy statement reported that, about five months before the 
appraisal to prove that fee paid to it by the subsidiary was fair); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 
A.2d 137, 143 (Del. 1980) (appraisal is to yield fair price within the context of the fiduciary duty of 
entire fairness owed by majority to minority). 
135. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
136. 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975). 
137. The appraiser's estimate of earnings value per share, $52.78, exceeded his estimate of 
asset value, $49.33. /d. at 467. This is the relationship to be expected for an ongoing corporation. 
The Gibbons court lowered the earnings figure to $39.79, which was below the appraiser's estimate 
of asset value. /d. at 468-73. Nevertheless, the court did not address the question ofwhcther the 
appraiser's estimate of asset value was too high or otherwise attempt to reconcile the inconsistency 
created. 
138. See supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. Cf. In re Imperial "400" Nat'! inc., 374 
F. Supp. 949, 974, 975 (D.N.J. 1974) (adding value of excess real estate to earnings value in a 
bankruptcy reorganization). 
140. 563 F.2d 35, 41-43 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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merger, Schenley had liquid assets of $162 million, or $20.25 per 
share, 141 in cash, certificates of deposit, and marketable securities. By 
the time of the merger, Schenley had sold a wine company for $14 mil-
lion in cash and marketable securities, and held an additional $16 mil-
lion in not readily marketable debentures issued by its parent. 142 At 
the time of the merger, Schenley apparently had over $190 million, or 
over $23.75 per share, in cash and securities, and most of those securi-
ties were highly liquid. 
Some of those liquid assets were required to maintain adequate 
working capitaJ.l43 Information on Schenley's need for working capital 
is not available in any of the reported decisions concerning the merger, 
but it is reasonable to infer that the liquid assets obtained from dispos-
ing of entire businesses were unlikely to be needed in the remaining 
operations. The $14 million in liquid assets received for the wine com-
pany would fall into this category, as would the $90 to $95 Iilillion in 
liquid assets remaining from Schenley's sale of its Buckingham subsidi-
ary just before the merger. 144 Moreover, for th;e three years preceding 
the merger, Schenley's parent had been reducing Schenley's excessive 
inventories of unpopular brands of whiskey.145 Although the amount 
of cash thus realized cannot be determined from the opinions, that 
amount probably represented surplus liquid assets. 
Another indicator of surplus liquid assets is the amount of cash 
Schenley transferred to its parent after Schenley merged into a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the parent. The second paragraph of the proxy 
statement said in bold print that ''in connection with the reorganization 
Schenley will transfer to [its parent] a substantial part of the proceeds 
received by Schenley from the recent sale of [Schenley's] subsidiary, 
The Buckingham Corporation."146 The Cole court found that a share-
holder could reasonably have concluded from the proxy statement that 
the parent's management intended to transfer to the parent between 
141. Id. at 40. 
142. I d. at 40-41. Management contended that a registration statement had to be filed before 
the debentures could be sold, pursuant to§ 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. C.§ 77e (1976). 
563 F.2d at41 n.ll. 
143. There is no discussion in Gibbons of any debt which had to be offset against earnings 
value or asset value, so it is assumed in the text that there was no significant debt against which 
surplus assets had to be applied. But cf. Cole, 563 F.2d at 4L(proxy statement for merger said that 
$10.5 million of the proceeds of the sale of Buckingham were to be used ''to prepay some of 
Schenley's outstanding debts to insurance companies."). If the assumption in the text is incorrect, 
appropriate adjustments in the calculations are necessary. 
144. Cole, 563 F.2d at 40-41. 
145. Gibbons, 339 A.2d at 466. 
146. Cole, 563 F.2d at 41. 
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$47 million and $102 million from funds which were not needed for 
Schenley's operations.147 By the' time of the Cole trial in October 1975, 
five months after the Gibbons decision, $75 million had been trans-
ferred from Schenley to its parent. 148 Funds transferred from Schenley 
to its parent undoubtedly reflected surplus assets which should have 
been added to the earnings value of the ongoing corporation. 
Whatever the correct figure for Schenley's surplus assets, it was a 
substantial amount per share. The lowest estimate of surplus asset 
value is $47 million, the amount which, according to the Cole court, the 
proxy statement implied was Schenley's unneeded liquid assets. To 
translate this value into a per common share figure on a fully diluted 
basis, the total should be divided by the number of common shares, 
eight million. 149 This represented over $5.88 per share that should 
have been added to a factfinder's estimate of earnings value per share 
from continuing operations. 
A higher estimate of surplus assets per share might well have been 
correct. A second possible estimate is $12.75 per share, based on the 
finding in Cole that the proxy statement implied that a transfer would 
be made to the parent of up to $102 million from funds not needed for 
Schenley's continuing operations. A third estimate can be derived from 
Schenley's possession of over $190 million in cash and securities at the 
time of the merger. Depending upon the requirements for working 
capital, surplus liquid assets might have exceeded $23.75 per share. 
Failure to take explicit account of surplus assets in valuing a corpora-
tion can obviously result in a serious underestimation of the true value. 
The surplus-asset-plus-earnings value must be compared to asset 
value; best-use value is the higher of the two. If Schenley's earnings 
from continuing operations is taken to be the $39.79 per share estimate 
147. Id at 42. The court found that a shareholder could have drawn this conclusion by com-
paring the proxy statement with the Plan and Agreement of Reorganization, which was an exhibit 
in the proxy statement. Id To ask the shareholder to follow this pattern of inference seems incon-
sistent with the holding of Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 432-35 (7th Cir. 1968), qfid 
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (proxy statement which made assertions 
later qualified by statements in smaller print was deficient). 
148. 563 F.2d at 43. Gibbons was submitted to the Court of Chancery in January 1975 and 
was decided in May 1975. Presumably the amount of cash transferred by those dates was less than 
the figure given in text. 
149. Outside shareholders seeking to enjoin the merger as unfair argued that the gross reve-
nue of $120 million received from Schenley's sale of its ·Buckingham Corporation had a value per 
share of$15.00. This amount results from dividing the gross revenue by 8 million shares. David 
J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. Ch. 1971). If some other divisor is 
appropriate to reflect the value per share of the surplus assets on a fully diluted basis, the figures in 
the text should be modified. 
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of earnings value in Gibbons, then addition of the minimum estimate of 
$5.88 per share in surplus liquid assets leads to a surplus-asset-plus-
earnings value of $45.67 per share. This is less than the asset value of 
$49.33 per share, so best-use value would be $49.33.150 The second esti-
mate of $12.75 per share, however, yields a surplus-asset-plus-earnings 
value of $52.54, which would than be the best-use value. 151 The third 
and largest estimate of $23.75 in liquid assets produces a surplus-asset-
plus-earnings value of $63.54, which represents a best-use value 88% 
higher than the appraisal value found by the court through the weight-
ing method. 152 
These estimates for best-use value are only tentative. A deduction 
for double counting must be made in each estimate, but additional in-
formation is needed to determine the proper amount of the deduction. 
The Gibbons court based its estimate of earnings value on Schenley's 
average earnings for the previous five years, which included the earn-
ings from Buckingham and from the wine subsidiary, 153 rather than on 
a prediction of Schenley's earnings from its continuing operations. To 
add an estimate of surplus liquid assets, which in part stemmed from 
the sale of Buckingham, to an estimate of earnings value which in-
cluded Buckingham's earnings would be double counting. If historical 
earnings, rather than a direct prediction of future earnings, 154 is to be 
used to estimate earnings value, then the portion of the historical earn-
ings attributable to Buckingham and the wine subsidiary shonld be es-
timated and deducted from previous earnings. The general conclusion 
150. Similarly, in Piemonte v. New Boston Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 734, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 
(1979), the surplus-asset-plus-earnings value was less than asset value. The subsidiary corporation 
being appraised had $5 million in excess liquid assets. Diluted over 224,892 shares, 377 Mass. at 
729 n.lO, 387 N.E.2d at 1151 n.lO, this amounts to $22.22 per share. If $22.22 is added to the 
earnings value per share of $52.60, 377 Mass. at 726, 387 N.E.2d at 1149, the total is $74.82, less 
than the net asset value of $103.16. 377 Mass. at 722 n.3, 387 N.E.2d at 1148 n.3. The trial court 
used the existence of excess liquid assets as a justification for assigning a 50% weight to net asset 
value. If the estimate of asset value was correct, however, that should have been the value of the 
corporation; use of the weighting method, with only a 50% weight assigned to asset value, underes-
timates the value per share. 
151. This estimate is close to the $53.33 per share received by Scheuley's founder, who held 
18% of Schenley's co=on stock in March 1968. See Cole, 563 F.2d at 37. 
152. This estimate shonld be compared to the price in the August 1968 tender offer by Glen 
Alden of$58.66 per share. See id at 37-38. There is reason to expect that the true value will be at 
least as great as the price in a tender offer because of the cost involved in making a tender offer. 
See i'!fra notes 242-45 and accompanying ~et. But cf. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 
Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 34 (DeL Ch. 1971} (argning that the intrinsic value was less than Glen Alden's 
tender offer price because the latter had been "distorted" by competition with a rival tender-
offeror). 
153. 339 A.2d at 468. 
154. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
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is unaltered, however: the best-use value of Schenley could not be de-
termined reliably without an analysis of surplus-asset-plus-earnings 
value. 
Corporations which must be appraised are more likely than corpo-
rations as a whole to have surplus assets. Companies which maintain 
liquid assets substantially above the amount needed for their opera-
tions are regarded as attractive targets for takeover attempts. 155 A suc-
cessful tender offer may be followed by a freezeout and an appraisal. A 
freezeout merger by the original management may also be precipitated 
if a corporation has significant surplus assets, whether liquid or not, or 
if its assets are otherwise failing to generate the earnings which could 
be obtained if they were used more productively.156 
Although the preceding discussion has drawn on the later Cole 
opinion, the facts discussed in Gibbons demonstrate that an appraiser 
or an outside shareholder will often be aware that surplus assets are 
present. The merger followed a tender offer for Schenley, perhaps mo-
tivated by the presence of the target company's surplus assets. 157 In 
fact, the Gibbons court acknowledged that the opportunity to tum 
Schenley's surplus assets into cash had been the reason for a tender 
offer battle between Glen Alden and another large company. 158 The 
court also recognized that during its three years of controlling Schen-
ley, Glen Alden had been realizing cash by disposing of Schenley's in-
ventories and collecting its receivables. 159 Thus, the evidence in the 
record put both the appraiser and the court on notice that a correct 
valuation of the corporation would entail an analysis of the surplus 
assets. 
A version of the correct analysis of the surplus assets case was ad-
vanced by the dissenting shareholders in Levin v. Midland-Ross 
Corp., 160 but was rejected by the vice-chancellor. 161 The management 
of the company had been liquidating plants, selling unneeded assets, 
including excess inventory, and preparing to sell other unused facilities 
and land during the period before the·merger. The court found that 
earnings from continuing operations were $1.00 per share and that an 
appropriate multiplier was seven, resulting in an earnings value of 
155. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
158. 339 A.2d at 465-67. 
159. Id. at 466. 
160. 194 A.2d 50 (Del. Ch. 1963). 
161. Id. at 57. 
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$7.00 per share.162 Excess liquid assets amounted to $16.70 per 
share. 163 Other unneeded assets such as unused land and machinery, 
amounted to over $6.00 per share.164 Adding the unneeded asset value 
per share of at least $22.70 to the earnings value from continuing oper-
ations of $7.00 per share yields $29.70 per share.165 The court, how-
ever, using the weighting method, awarded only $24.71 per share.166 
The dissenters in Levin asked the court to determine the value of the 
corporation by adding the capitalized value of its manufacturing opera-
tions to the value ofits unneeded assets. 167 The court rejected this con-
tention, relying solely on precedent. It cited In re General Realty & 
Utilities Corp. , 168 an opinion in Vice-Chancellor Seitz refused to accept 
the proposition that appraisal value should never be less than asset 
value. 169 
One recent decision, although grounded in the case's special cir-
cumstances, has applied the correct method of valuation for surplus 
assets. This occurred in the unreported Delaware appraisal opinion, In 
re Creole Petroleum Corp. , 170 which did not discuss the earlier rejection 
of the correct approach in Levin. The assets of a subsidiary, which had 
been used to produce and refine crude oil in Venezuela, were to be 
nationalized, but other assets not described by the court· were to con-
tinue to be used in operations. The parent corporation, which had ac-
quired 95.4% ofthe common stock in 1961, executed a freezeout merger 
and dissenting shareholders obtained an appraisal. The vice-chancel-
162. Id 
163. Id 
164. Id at 56-58. The court remarked that "there is no showing that [failure to invest the idle 
assets] was improper," although it acknowledged that the failure depressed earnings. Id at 56. It 
also remarked that "a non-productive dollar asset is worth less than a full dollar." Id at 58. The 
court erred in thus permitting insiders, through a lower appraisal award, to profit from failure 
either to invest the corporation's assets productively or distribute them to shareholders. See supra 
text accompanying note 133; i'!fra notes 220-24 and accompanying text. 
165. 194 A.2d at 58. The court's estimate of asset value, $35.67, was even higher. Id at 57. If 
this estimate was valid, then total, rather than partial, liquidation was the best use of the corpora-
tion's assets, and the best-use value was $35.67. The court, however, affirmed the use of book 
value as the estimate of asset value, and there was evidence that book value exceeded liquidation 
value. Id at 54. Thus, the surplus-assets analysis may well have been correct. 
166. Id at 58. The court incorrectly attempted to take account of the presence of $22.70 per 
share of unneeded assets by reducing the weight for the low earnings value, pointing out that if 
earnings value were given a "maximum" weight of 50%, the appraisal value would be only $17.30 
per share. Id 
167. Id at 55-56. 
168. 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (DeL Ch. 1947). 
169. Id at 498-99, 52 A.2d at 15. For criticism of that case, see i'!fra notes 269-301 and 
accompanying text. 
170. No. 4860 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1978), reprinted in 3 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 606 (1978). 
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lor affirmed the valuation of the appraiser, who had obtained the ap-
praisal value by adding the value per share of the consideration to be 
received for the nationalized assets to the value per share of future 
earnings from continuing operations. 171 The vice-chancellor's opinion, 
however, did not explain the reasons why this method of valuation was 
used. 172 In fact, the vice-chancellor described the process as assigning a 
weight of 100% to asset value and 100% to future earnings value, even 
though what occurred was the addition of the values rather than the 
taking of a weighted average. 173 He compounded this confusion by as-
serting that the process departed from Delaware precedent by assigning 
a weight of 100% to asset value when a maximum weight of 50% was 
preferred. 174 The Delaware Supreme Court has cited Creole Petroleum 
as precedent for assigning a weight of 100% to asset value. 175 Because 
of this confusion, Creole Petroleum is not likely to lead to an adoption 
of the correct appraisal method in Delaware. 
III. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 
WEIGHTING METHOD 
As discussed above, the weighting method has been subjected to little 
criticism. Nevertheless, an apologist for the weighting method might 
offer several justifications for its use. In this section, six possible justifi-
cations for the weighting method are considered. First, the weighting 
method may be regarded as a compromise among several competing 
measures of the value of a security. The appeal of this justification lies 
in the tacit assumption that the weighting method achieves benefits 
similar to those of compromise in other decisionmaking contexts. This 
assumption is false, however, because the weighting method does not 
strike a legitimate compromise between independent estimates of the 
value of a security. 176 Second, it can be argued that the weights repre-
sent the probabilities corresponding to each of the ways in which share-
holders might have received the value generated by the corporation, 
had no merger taken place. The weights assigned in an appraisal case 
171. Market value was found unreliable and therefore was given no weight. 3 DEL. J. CoRP. 
L. 606, 611 (1978). 
172. Id at 610-14. 
173. Id at 614. To further confuse the analysis, the vice-chancellor characterized the value of 
future earnings as an asset. Id Historical earnings were assigned a weight of zero on the ground 
that nationalization would change the nature of the company's business. Id at 611-12. 
174. Former cases were distingnished on the ground that they did not apply to companies 
whose assets were being nationalized. Id at 614. 
175. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 142 (Del 1980). 
176. See infra notes 182-205 and accompanying text 
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for a typical corporation, however, are poorly correlated with reason-
able estimates of the probablities of a shareholder receiving benefits 
through liquidation, sale of his shares on the market, or receipt of divi-
dends. 177 More significantly, this justification assumes that insiders 
should be able to dictate the terms on which outsiders will receive value 
for their shares, even where, as a result of the terms, the outsiders real-
ize less than they would under a different course qf action. The as-
sumption that insiders should be able to dictate the terms in which 
outsiders will receive value for their shares is sometimes offered as a 
third independent justification for the weighting method. 178 This as-
sumption is inconsistent, however, with the fiduciary duty owed by 
controlling shareholders and management to the minority shareholders 
of a corporation. Fourth, it might be argued that the undervaluation of 
outsiders' shares which results from the use of the weighting m:ethod 
has the desirable effect of encouraging the takeover of badly managed 
corporations. Even if this argument justified a deliberate policy of 
awarding less than the fair value of the outsiders' shares, however, it 
would not support the use of the weighting method as a remedy which 
is supposed to yield fair values for corporate shares. Nor does the ar-
gument justify application of the weighting method of appraisal to a 
conflict-of-interest merger when there has not been an ouster of incum-
bent management through a takeover bid. Moreover, the argument 
goes too far: the undervaluation produced by the weighting method 
could create perverse incentives for unjustified takeover bids on corpo-
rations which have been well managed. 179 Fifth, it may be argued that 
the freezeout benefits the outsiders, and that an appraisal remedy when 
the freezeout price exceeds the market price, which accurately values 
stock will discourage such freezeouts. An inadequate appraisal rem-
edy, however, creates an opportunity for management to profit from 
the temporary misuse of resources when it would otherwise be in its 
interest to use those resources efficiently. If a remedy is needed for 
outside shareholders, a better one can be devised than freezeout at an 
unfair price.18° Finally, the weighting method is frequently justified by 
an appeal to judicial precedent. The cases which led to the develop-
ment of the weighting method in Delaware, however, did not ade-
quately consider whether the valuations which they produced were 
accurate. Moreover, the development of the weighting method de-
177. See infta notes 206-16 and accompanying text. 
178. See infta notes 217-33 and accompanying text. 
179. See infta notes 234-48 and accompanying text. 
180. See infta notes 249-57 and accompanying text. 
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pended on language used in earlier cases without giving careful atten-
tion to the economic context in which the language was used. Because 
there is ample ground to conclude that Delaware appraisals are in-
tended to produce accurate valuations, it would not violate principles 
of stare decisis for Delaware courts to abandon the use of the weighting 
method.181 
A. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION: THE WEIGHTING METHOD AS 
COMPROMISE 
The weighting method appears to· be a compromise among several dif-
ferent ways of measuring the value of a corporation. Both courts and 
commentators have invoked this intuitively appealing characteristic as 
a justification for weighting. Adopting the weighting method in a case 
of first impression, one court reasoned that "[h]aving determined the 
value of a share . . . by each method, the problem becomes one of 
weighing the various factors to reach a final result that properly takes 
into consideration all of the elements and factors involved in determin-
ing the fair value 9f a share .... " 182 In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 183 
the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "[w]e feel as the Vice-Chan-
cellor that the 40% weight assigned to asset value . . . and the 60% 
weight assigned to earnings value . . . fairly capture the situation 
••• .''
184
. A commentator in a survey of appraisal cases over ten years 
ago was more explicit: 
Consideration of at least the three factors discussed [asset value, 
market value, and earnings value] helps to minimize the effect of de-
fects in any one and to assure that no single computation will be 
determinative. Even if perfectly accurate values could be derived for 
assets, market, and earnings, the three figures will seldom be identi-
cal. Although each is a suitable measure of stock for certain pur-
poses, each requires the appraiser to make different assumptions as to 
stockholder objectives. 
Once the various elements have been computed, they must be 
balanced in order to arrive at a figure that will represent fair consid-
eration for the dissenter's stock. The relative weights will necessarily 
vary according to the type of business involved and the special cir-
cumstances surrounding the particular company. Less weight should 
181.. See infta notes 258-334 and accompanying text. 
182. Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 258 (N.D. 1971). Cf. Chazen, supra 
note 81, at 1448 ("The appraisal method of valuation attempts to reduce all the elements of a 
company's value to a single number."). 
183. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). 
184. Id at 146. 
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be given a particular element when the estimate of its value is unreli-
able .... 185 
Another commentator characterized the weighting method as "able to 
uncover elements of value temporarily hidden by artificially low stock 
prices."Is6 
There are many kinds of compromise, with differing purposes and 
justifications. 187 At issue here is the validity of adopting a figure be-
tween what purport to be differing measures of the value of the corpo-
ration.188 Michael 0. Finkelstein has raised the general objection that 
a factfinder confronted with differing conclusions from competing sta-
tistical models should never strike a balance between the two. Instead, 
he should decide which model is correct and accept the conclusion of 
that model. 189 
The choice of a value which lies between the estimates of two differ-
ent models, though it might appear to a layman's rough sense of 
compromise to be supported by the results of each, is in reality consis-
tent with the assumptions of neithe~ so that the compromise would lack 
any evidentiary support . ... [Use of a compromise between there-
sults of two or more models] suggests that personal judgment, rather 
than hard evidence, [is] the basis for [the] decision.190 
Finkelstein does not explain why it would be unreasonable for a 
factfinder to have doubts about the assumptions of different models, 
and yet average the results to reach a compromise. It would seem that 
a determination by the factfinder that approximates the result of a 
185. Note, supra note 28, at 1468. The commentator, however, praised the requirement in 
Delaware that explicit weights be assigned "[to guard] against the possibility that the figures will 
be merely a compromise between the contentions of the parties or an intuitive judgn~ent." Id at 
1469. 
186. Arsht, supra note 14, at 1500. 
187. On compromise generally, see COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS: NOMOS 
XXI (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979). On court-imposed compromise when liability is un-
certain, see Coons, Compromise As Precise Justice, in id at 190; Coons, Approaches to Court Im-
posed Compromise-The Uses of .Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 750 (1964). 
188. See, e.g., Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 254, 258 (N.D. 1971) (char-
acterizing asset value, earnings value, and market value as methods of measuring the value of 
shares). . 
189. Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1442, 
1467-71 (1973). Finkelstein's argnment is addressed to the problem faced by a decisionmaker who 
is presented with evidence which includes the results of two or more conflicting econometric stud-
ies. His objections seem applicable as well to a factfinder confronted with conflicting measures of 
the value of a corporation that are based on different methods of estimating value. 
190. Id at 1470 (emphasis added). In support of his argument, Finkelstein cites only a con-
versation with Herbert Robbins, Professor of Statistics at Columbia University. Id at 1470 n.l22. 
For a similar argument, see supra note 185. 
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model is consistent with that result and receives evidentiary support 
from that model. Moreover, a decision that is close to the results of 
several models might well be considered a judgment appropriate to the 
factfinder's role, rather than mere personal judgment. 191 
The propriety of striking a compromise in appropriate circum-
stances is supported by the statistical decision theory developed to solve 
the panel-of-experts problem, in which a decisionmaker is confronted 
by differing expert opinions about a numerical value on which a deci-
sion depends. 192 One of the standard solutions to the panel-of-experts 
problem is to take a weighted average of the experts' opinions. 193 The 
appraisal problem could be regarded as a panel-of-experts problem if it 
were valid to assume that the measures typically used-asset value, 
earnings value, and market value-are equivalent to expert opinions on 
the value of the corporation. If a method of measurement is theoreti-
cally valid and if no error can be found in the calculations, 194 then it is 
reasonable to regard the figure resulting from the application of that 
method as providing valuable information about the disputed value 
and therefore to assign a positive weight to that figure. 195 
The problem with the weighting method as applied to appraisals is 
not that it is erroneous to strike a compromise among differing meas-
ures of the value of a corporation. The problem is that it is fallacious to 
assume that asset value and earnings value can measure simultaneously 
the true value of a corporation. When asset value and earnings value 
are unequal, only the higher of the two should be regarded as a me as-
191. Cf., e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 371 Mass. 719, 731, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 
1152 (1979) (trier of fact may adopt a valuation different from that of any witness). 
192. See H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 228-33 (1968) (discussing the more general problem 
where experts differ both as to which outcomes are more desirable and as to probabilities); Morris, 
supra note 94, at 293 (applying Bayesian statistical theory to measure the 'joint information repre-
sented by the probability assessments of a panel of experts"). 
193. H. RAIFFA, supra note 192, at 230-33; Morris, supra note 94, at 679. For example, the 
International Time Bureau .in Paris collects readings from various atomic clocks in government 
laboratories around the world. Official international time is an average of those readings, with 
some weighting in favor of the steadiest clocks. N. CALDER, EINSTEIN'S UNIVERSE 30 (1979). 
194. Although Finkelstein's general theoretical objection is incorrect, it suggests a useful pro-
cedure. Before averaging differing estimates, or combining them in some other way, a deei-
sionmaker should attempt to find out why the estimates differ and whether any errors have been 
made. Cf. supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text (estimation error as a possible explanation 
for calculations which find asset value to be greater than earnings value). Errors should be cor-
rected individually, because it is unsound to assume that they will cancel out. See i'![ra notes 197-
205 and accompanying text. 
195. A variation of the weighting method has been proposed, in which the decisionmaker 
would adjust the opinion of each expert in accordance with that expert's previous tendency to 
underestimate or overestimate. Morris, supra note 94, at 684. 
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ure of the corporation's value; the lower value is incorrect for the very 
reason that it is lower. This is because asset value and earnings value 
describe the results of alternative courses of conduct: liquidation or 
continuation of the corporation. Only one course of conduct will be 
taken, and it is the more valuable of these courses of conduct which is 
the true value of the corporation. A compromise between the values is 
clearly invalid and prejudicial to dissenting shareholders. Compromise 
by factfinders occurs frequently and often may be justified, but the 
weighting method does not produce a true compromise between in-
dependent measures of a corporation's value. 196 
A variant of the compromise justification is the belief that giving 
weight to one measure of value can correct an error in another measure 
of value. In 1966, Professor Herwitz pointed out that 
it seems that in every case where an asset value factor was included it 
exceeded the figure derived by capitalizing earnings and therefore 
resulted in increasing the final value figure. Thus inclusion of an 
asset value factor has had the effect, if not the purpose, of countering 
the possibility that too conservative a multiplier was used in capital-
izing earnings. 
On the other hand, in some circumstances the asset value factor 
could play the opposite role and offset an overly optimistic capitali-
zation of earnings. 197 
Flaws in the argument that weighting will correct unspecified er-
rors are illustrated by Chancellor Seitz's opinion in Felder v. Anderson~ 
Clayton & Co. 198 In that case, the dissenting shareholders objected to 
the appraiser's estimate of annual earnings which was the average of 
the company's earnings over the previous five years, a period that in-
cluded a very large loss resulting from one year of drought. Because 
196. It would be reasonable to take a weighted average of best-use value and market value if 
market value could be regarded as an unbiased estimate of the value of the firm. The weights 
would reflect the factfinder's relative confidence in best-use value and market value as estimates of 
the true value of the corporation being appraised. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text. 
There is good reason, however, to believe that the market price will be depressed in conflict-of-
interest mergers. See supra note 29. If concentration of ownership has caused the threat of a 
freezeout to depress the market price, giving weight to that market price without correcting for 
bias would fulfill the market's prophecy that insiders can benefit at the expense of outsiders. See 
supra note 29 and accompanying text; in.fra notes 220-24 and accompanying text. 
197. D. HERWITZ, supra note 49, at 25. See also Comment, supra note 79, at 430 ("[A)ssets 
. . . provide a necessary counterweight to the other factors in the appraisal process."). Since Her-
witz wrote in 1966, a nonzero weight has been assigned to an asset value which was below earn-
ings value. See Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 
1973), ajf'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); supra text accompanying notes 109-19. 
198. 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960). 
1072 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1031 
that was the only loss for the company during the previous ten years, 
the dissenters urged that the appraiser use a ten-year average, which 
would have lessened the impact of the one bad year. The chancellor 
acknowledged that "reasonable men might differ in the first instance as 
to what period should be employed to obtain average earnings," but 
affirmed the appraiser's use of a five-year period as within the range of 
reason. 199 He added that, "[a ]ny unfairness arising from the use of the 
[earnings from the bad year] can be offset in arriving at the ultimate 
weight given this factor."200 
The appraiser had rejected depreciated reproduction cost as a 
measure of asset value because a capitalization of the income which 
could be earned from the assets indicated that their reproduction would 
be unprofitable. Nevertheless, the chancellor adopted depreciated re-
production cost as a standard for valuation. He admitted that "it may 
be that actual [asset] value is somewhat less," but argued that ''that, 
negative factor . . . can be taken care of by reducing the weight which 
would otherwise be given asset value in arriving at appraised value."201 
Thus, the chancellor argued that an appropriate adjustment of the 
relative weights for asset value and earnings value would correct two 
different possible errors. On the one hand, the estimate of earnings 
value would be too low if the five-year period used in calculating an-
nual earnings did not represent the typical earnings pattern of the fum. 
Correction of this error called for the assignment of a higher weight to 
the estimate of asset value, which exceeded the estimate of earnings 
value, 202 than was otherwise justified. On the other hand, the chancel-
lor conceded that asset value might be overestimated. Correction of 
this error required the assignment of a lower weight to asset value and 
a correspondingly higher weight to earnings value than would other-
wise be appropriate. To correct the first error, the relative weight for 
asset value should have been raised; to correct the second error, it 
should have been lowered. To make these adjustments accurately the 
magnitude of each error would have had to been considered. If the 
199. 39 Del. Ch. at 87, 159 A.2d at 284. 
200. Id 
201. 39 Del. Ch. at 84, 159 A.2d at 283. For similar language, see 39 Del. Ch. at 86, 159 A.2d 
at 284 (''In dete~g the ultimate weight given asset value the appraiser can 'discount' depreci-
ated reproduction cost evidence and thus offi;et one of the dangers of its use."). The use of depre-
ciated reproduction cost to measure asset value is an error which has been corrected in Delaware. 
See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text 
202. If asset value is below earnings value, it does not appear possible to correct an initial 
underestimation of earnings value by adjusting the relative weights of asset value and earnings 
value. 
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adjustments require that the magnitude of each error be considered, the 
estimates should simply be corrected, rather than taking the additional 
step of adjusting weight~. 
The potential for confusion created in Felder by the court's at-
tempt to correct indirectly errors with unspecified magnitudes through 
undisclosed alterations of weights was compounded by the chancellor's 
unwillingness to take a position on whether there were errors in the 
estimates. His statements on the issue were ambiguous: "It may be 
that actual [asset] value is somewhat less"203 and "any unfairness [in 
earnings value] can be ~ffset."204 
Such ambignity creates the impression that the weighting method 
is a catch-all designed to assure the reader, and indeed the author, of an 
opinion that errors will cancel out, thereby making a careful examina-
tion of the valuation issue unnecessary.205 There is no justification, 
however, for assuming that errors will cancel out without an examina-
tion of their magnitude and direction. Once the magnitude and direc-
tion of the errors is calculated, the proper course of action .is to adjust 
the estimated values directly, not to compensate by adjusting the 
weights. 
B. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION: WEIGHTING REFLECTS THE 
PROBABILITIES OF LIQUIDATION OR CONTINUATION OF THE 
CORPORATION 
It might be argued that the weight attached to a value factor corre-
sponds to the probability that the shareholder would have received that 
value had no merger taken place. That is, the weight assigued to mar-
ket value might correspond to the probability that the shareholder 
would have sold her stock; the weight for earnings value to the 
probability that she would have retained her shares for a considerable 
period of time; and the weight for asset value to the probability of cor-
porate liquidation.206 
203. 39 Del. Ch. at 84, 159 A.2d at 283. 
204. Id at 87, 159 A.2d at 284. 
205. An appraiser side-stepped resolution of the problems created when the estimated asset 
value greatly exceeds the estimated earnings value, writing: "'Fortunately, I need not go exten-
sively into this area because the present weighting of assets takes care of whatever disparity may 
exist [between market price and asset value].'" Appraiser's Report at 38, Bell v. Kirby Lumber 
Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 145 (Del. 1980). The Delaware Supreme Court quoted this passage with 
approval. 413 A.2d at 145. See supra note 70-77 and accompanying text. 
206. Cf. Note, supra note 28, at 1468-69 ("Although each [factor] is a suitable measure of 
stock for certain purposes, each requires the appraiser to make different assumptions as to stock-
holder objectives."). 
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This scenario would justify the use of weighting as an attempt to 
award the dissenting shareholder the expected value of the returns 
from owning the stock in the absence of a merger.207 This analysis is 
consistent with the language in some appraisal cases. For example, in 
determining the appropriate weight to be given to asset value, courts 
have questioned whether management had any plans to liquidate.208 
In. In re .Delaware Racing Association,209 the court assigned a relatively 
large weight to market value on the ground that the dissenting share-
holder would probably have realized her returns from ownership by 
selling her stock if the merger had not taken place.210 
In general, however, this justification is not consistent with the 
weights assigned in appraisal cases. For example, it is unlikely that the 
probability of liquidation for a continuing corporation whose earnings 
value exceeds its asset value is as high as the 12.5% assigned to asset 
value in Francis L duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studio~ Inc. ,211 and 
12.5% is one of the lowest weights ever assigned to asset value in Dela-
ware appraisal cases. 212 
A more significant weakness of this justification is that the 
probability should be zero that a properly managed corporation, when 
faced with the choice of liquidation or continued operation, will follow 
the less rewarding course of action.213 Accordingly, an asset value 
which is below earnings value can only play a role if earnings value 
subsequently declines below the level of asset value,214 and the earn-
207. Expected value is the weighted sum of possible outcomes multiplied by the probability 
that each outcome will occur. The expected value is an important way to summarize a prediction 
of future earnings. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHtRELSTElN, supra note 30, at 65. 
208. See, e.g., In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), qffd 271 A.D. 
1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947). 
209. 42 Del. Ch. 175, 206 A.2d 664 {Del. Ch.), qffd, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d -203 (Del. 
1965). 
210. 42 Del. Ch. at 186, 206 A.2d at 670. 
21 I. 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975). 
212. In assigning a zero weight to asset value in Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 
460, 473 (Del. Ch. 1975) the court cited the weight of 12.5% assigned in Universal City Studios, 312 
A.2d at 352. In that case, however, the parties agreed that the weight assigned to earnings value 
should be seven times that assigned to asset value. 312 A.2d at 352. For criticism of the assign-
ment of zero weight to asset value in Gibbons see supra notes 137-59 and accompanying text. A 
survey of appraisal cases lists no case besides Gibbons and Universal City Studios with an asset 
value weight below 20%. Note, supra note 6, at 641-42. 
213. Striking a weighted average of earnings value and asset value is thus incorrect. Taking a 
weighted average of best-use value and market value, with the weights reflecting the relative 
probability that a shareholder would choose to realize the market value by selling her stock rather 
than holding it, might be defensible if market price were untainted by the presence of a conflict of 
interest. The market price is tainted, however. See supra notes 29, 196. 
214. The estimate of best-use value should reflect protection against disaster provided by an 
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ings value estimate should already reflect the possibility of that occur-
ring.215 A corporation whose properly measured asset value exceeds 
properly measured earnings value should be liquidated. For such a 
corporation, the probability of realizing asset value should be 100%,216 
on the assumption that management will act to realize the highest value 
of the corporation. 
C. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION: OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS HAVE No 
RIGHTS To HAVE THE ASSETS LIQUIDATED EVEN IF 
LIQUIDATION WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO 
THE CORPORATION 
A more extreme version of the notion that the weight for asset value 
should depend on whether management had plans to liquidate the cor-
poration is built on the contention that even if asset value exceeds earn-
ings value, outside shareholders have no power to compel liquidation. 
For example, in In re Behrens,211 where asset value exceeded earnings 
value, the following argument was advanced as an alternative basis for 
the decision: 
Assuming, as the Court does on the basis of the record, that the com-
pany could be liquidated to produce the valuations for the preferred 
and common stocks attributed to them by the appraisers, the fact 
remains that this company was not to be liquidated; that petitioners 
had no expectation or right to have it liquidated or considered on a 
liquidating basis. The company was engaged in an operating busi-
ness, with its assets employed at the risks of the business, with the 
hope, of course, that the operations would make the investment prof-
itable, although it had not been altogether profitable in the past.218 
As a general rule management has a fiduciary duty of due care to 
opportunity to liquidate assets when earnings tum out to be low. See supra notes 101-06 and 
accompanying text. 
215. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
216. Yet 60% has been the highest weight for asset value in Delaware even where asset value 
exceeded earnings value. See Note, supra note 6, at 641-42. Indeed, in Levin v. Midland-Ross 
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 289, 194 A.2d 50, 58 (Del. Ch. 1963), the appraiser's weight for asset value 
was reduced from 60% to 50% because no previous Delaware case had assigned a weight greater 
than 50%. In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 143 (Del. 1980), the court asserted that 
asset value had been assigned a weight of 100% in In re Creole Petroleum Corp., C.A. No. 4860 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1978), reprinted in 3 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 606 (1978). This assertion is incorrect. 
The vice-chancellor in Creole spoke of giving a 100% weight to nonoperating assets and a 100% 
weight to the present value offuture earnings from operating assets, 3 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 612-14, 
but the two figures were simply added. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. 
217. 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), affd, 271 A.D. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947). 
218. 61 N.Y.S.2d at 183. 
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the corporation.219 In the normal course of corporate conduct, how-
ever, the business judgment rule shields management from lawsuits al-
leging a breach of this fiduciary duty. A complaint alleging that 
management has failed to pursue the course of conduct which is most 
advantageous to the corporation will be dismissed unless there is a 
showing of fraud, conflict of interest or gross abuse of discretion.220 
The business judgment rule, however, has no proper place in appraisal 
proceedings because the vast majority of appraisals involve a conflict of 
interest, i.e., a freezeout.221 In other words, whether or not the business 
judgment rule shields management from liability when the failure to 
liquidate harms all shareholders equally, a freezeout is a fundamen-
tally different case: management has isolated an identifiable minority 
for disparate treatment. The consequence must be that management is 
obliged to treat the minority fairly, including paying the asset value for 
their shares if corporate liquidation is objectively the most profitable 
alternative. 
Also, the business judgment rule has been justified on the grounds 
that it will prevent overcrowding of courts, and that courts are not com-
petent to review the questions involved in corporate decisions. 222 Such 
justifications are inapplicable to appraisal proceedings, however, be-
cause in these proceedings the dispute is already before the court and 
the court has the obligation to determine the corporation's value.223 
Management's conflict of interest in a freezeout is readily apparent; 
they retain the option of switching the resources of the corporation into 
their most profitable use after the appraisal has been completed.224 Ju-
dicial tolerance of such self-dealing, implicit in the weighting method, 
permits management to take advantage of a failure to use the resources 
of a corporation to best advantage and creates an incentive to operate 
219. C.f. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977) ("[T]hose who control the 
corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the minority in the exercise thereof over corporate 
powers and property .... "). On the general theory of fiduciary duties, see Anderson, Conflicts of 
Interest: Efliclency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738 (1978); Hethering-
ton, Tlte Minority's JJuty of Loyalty in Close Corporations, 1972 DUKE L.J. 921. See supra notes 
63, 127 (discussing the fiduciary duties owed by management to both the corporation and the 
minority shareholders). 
220. See, e.g., Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 428-29, 140 A. 264, 
266-67 (Del. 1927). See supra note 63. 
221. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
222. Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 815, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1976). 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 7-25. 
224. C.f. supra note 87 Qiquidation of subsidiary six years after going-private tender offer at 
large premium over tender price). 
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the company inefficiently before a freezeout takes place, thus violating 
the fiduciary duty of due care. 
The attempted justification discussed in this section concedes that 
a corporation's assets would be more valuable if liquidated, but asserts 
nonetheless that it is proper for the majority to force the outsiders to 
accept less than asset value. Outrageous as the argument is, a variant 
was recently advanced by the defendant corporation in Bell v. Kirby 
Lumber Corp. 225 The argument succeeded at each level of decision in 
reducing the appraised value of the corporation's common stock. In 
the proceedings before the appraiser, the corporation drew on the testi-
mony of a prominent investment banker to argue that without a sale, 
liquidation, or merger, the minority was ''locked in" and would have 
been restricted to earnings and dividends until such an event took 
place.226 The appraiser found a per share asset value of $456, which 
greatly exceeded the per share earnings value of $120.227 He also con-
cluded that the assets "could have been fairly quickly liquidated had 
the management wished to do so."228 In effect the corporation was ar-
guing that the outside shareholders were restricted to the receipts gen-
erated by the course of action chosen by management, even though the 
evidence indicated that this course of action was disadvantageous. 
The appraiser implied that his choice of weights for asset value 
and earnings value was influenced by the corporation's argument.229 
After summarizing the appraiser's discussion of the ''locked-in" argu-
ment, the vice-chancellor expressed no disagreement: ''I find myself in 
a position wherein I can find no solid justification for deviating from 
the weightings assigned by the Appraiser."230 
At the second stage of review, the Delaware Supreme Court ap-
parently adopted the proposition that the assets of the corporation 
should be valued on the basis of the use to which management was 
currently putting them rather than the use to which they should be put: 
Santa Fe, as the holder of 95% of Kirby's outstanding stock had the 
power to do with Kirby whatever it chose. Based upon the [most 
optimistic] appraisal of assets [rejected by the appraiser] it could have 
225. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). 
226. Appraiser's Report at 37, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). 
227. Id at 39. 
228. Id at 37. 
229. Id 
230. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730, 740 (Del. Ch. 1978), qff'd, 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 
1980). The court may have been paraphrasing the outsiders' arguments in this passage, however, 
rather than taking a position of its own. 
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liquidated Kirby and realized approximately $670 per share for each 
stockholder. ,It could have negotiated a merger with an unrelated 
corporation; or it could have permitted the minority to continue in 
the corporation for better or for worse. Instead Santa Fe chose to 
cash out the minority because the price of the minority stock was as 
low as Santa Fe management could anticipate under existing market 
conditions?31 
The supreme court then concurred with the vice-chancellor's affirm-
ance of the appraiser's conclusions as to weights.232 The court disre-
garded the inconsistency between this conclusion and its earlier 
declaration that an appraisal proceeding must be conducted within the 
context of the fiduciary duty of entire fairness owed by the majority 
shareholders to the minority?33 
D. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION: ENCOURAGEMENT OF TENDER 
OFFERS FOR POORLY MANAGED COMPANIES 
Economists Grossman and Hart have argued that after a successful 
tender offer for control of~ corp01;ation, a freezeout of the outsiders for 
a price less than the best-use value of their shares should be permit-
ted?34 Analogously, it may be argued that the award in an appraisal 
following a tender offer and freezeout should also be below the true 
value?35 This argument presupposes that the management of a corpo-
ration may fail to make the best use of its resources236 resulting in a 
waste of society's resources?37 In such a situation, the shareholders 
who have an interest in correcting the inefficiency have few effective 
remedies. Proxy fights have so many limitations that they are seldom 
231. 413 A.2d at 140. 
232. Id. at 146. In his concurring opinion, Justice Quillen expressed doubts about the mea-
surement of the earnings value, but agreed that "the Appraiser's weighting of earning value and 
asset value, carefully reviewed by the vice-chancellor, was within the permissible realm of reason-
able judgment" I d.. at 151 (Quillen, J., concurring). 
233. Id. at 140. 
234. Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 42 (1980). 
235. See Grossman & Hart, ./)isc/osure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323, 329 (1980). 
236. A statistical analysis of cash tender offers from January 1956 to June 1974 found that the 
shares in firms which had resisted the tender offer had experienced returns significantly below 
what would otherwise have been expected in the period from 24 months to four months before the 
offer. Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 FIN., 505, 506-
07, 511 (1978). 
237. Economists have generally focused their attention on allocative efficiency-the proper 
distribution of resources among firms-rather than on what Professor Leibenstcin has called "X-
efficiency'': the proper use of resources within a firm. The waste described in text would be an 
example of X-inefficiency. Leibenstein argues that X-inefficiency may be a more important source 
of waste than allocative inefficiency. See H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND EcONOMIC MAN 29-47 {1976). 
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undertaken.238 The business judgment rule effectively prevents most 
shareholder suits.239 If dissatisfied shareholders simply sell the stock of 
a mismanaged corporation, the market price will reflect the current 
inefficient use of the corporation's resources, and pressure on manage-
ment to improve its performance is reduced.Z40 Thus, it is argued, a 
takeover bid is a valuable device through which inefficient manage-
ment can be replaced by a management which is prepared to use the 
corporation's resources more effectively.Z4 I The mere possibility of a 
successful takeover bid will generate pressure on management to in-
crease efficiency. 
This control on inefficient management is imperfect, however, be-
cause a takeover attempt is costly and risky.Z42 A hostile tender offer for 
control will be made only when a raider believes that the profit it can 
obtain from improving the performance of the target company will jus-
tify the costs and risk involved. Grossman and Hart argue that if 
outside shareholders are able at the second step of a two-step t~keover, 
such as a freezeout, a merger after a tender offer, to obtain more than 
the original tender price,243 a "free-rider'' effect will result,244 with the 
nontendering outsiders capturing part of the benefits of the takeover 
without bearing any of its costs.Z45 Some takeovers, which would other-
wise be worthwhile, will not be undertaken if some of the gains which 
result can be captured by free riders. Other attempted takeovers may 
fail if enough minority shareholders attempt to free ride, wrongly guess 
that the raiders will succeed, and therefore refuse to tender. 
238. See Manne, Cash Tender 0./frrs for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE 
L.J. 231, 238 [hereinafter cited as Cash Tender 0./frrs]; Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corpo-
rate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. llO, ll4-15 (1965). 
239. See st~pra note 220 and accompanying text. 
240. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VoiCE, AND LoYALTY 46 (1970). 
241. See. e.g., Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 
632-34 (1967). 
242. SeeR. WINTERS, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 21-24 (1978); Smiley, Tender 
Offers, Transactions Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 58 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 22, 22-23, 29-
31 (1976) (evidence that the threat of takeover tends to assure only that a firm is operated at about 
86% of the value it would have if its resources were used optimally); Smiley, The E./fret of the 
Williams Amendment and Other Factors on Transactions Costs in Tender 0./frrs, 3 INDUS. ORGANI-
ZATION REv. 138, 138-45 (1975). 
243. A study of a sample of 57 tender offers between November 15, 1973 and June 30, 1977 
found that a freezeout within one year is likely after a successful tender offer, with the freezeout 
price being ouly slightly above the tender price. Borden & Weiner, An Investment .Decision Analy-
sis of Cash Tender 0./frr .Disclosure, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 553, 565, 568, 570, 572, 645-46 (1978). 
244. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of a free-rider effect in 
an antitrust context. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977). 
245. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 234, at 42-45. The argument that follows in text 
makes slightly different assumptions than those made by Grossman and Hart. 
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An appraisal remedy which permits dissenters from the second 
step of a two-step takeover to obtain the true value of their shares 
would encourage free riders because the true value will exceed the 
tender prices unless the raider has miscalculated the true value. The 
Grossman-Hart argument thus applies to any appraisal remedy which 
awards true value of a share. This argument might justify an explicit 
change in the law to deny an appraisal remedy at the second step of a 
two-step takeover so that tender offers would not be chilled.246 For 
example, the Brudney-Chirelstein proposal might be· adopted, under 
which outsiders may be lawfully frozen out at the second step of a two-
step takeover if the freezeout price is at least equal to the original 
tender offer price.247 At present, however, a dissenter from a merger is 
entitled, through an appraisa~ to the true value of her shares whether 
or not the merger is the second step of a two-step takeover. The Gross-
man-Hart argument, in any event, does not justify avoiding the free 
rider effect through the use of the weighting method. Even if it were 
decided that in a two-step merger dissenting shareholders should re-
ceive less than the true value of their shares, there would be little justifi-
cation for use of the weighting method. The weighting method 
undervalues shares by an arbitrary amount, unrelated to the amount by 
which, that under the Grossman-Hart argument, the award to share-
holders should fall short of the true value. Moreover, at the second 
step of a two-step merger, use of the weighting method, or of any rule 
that might permit a freezeo~t at a lower price than the tender price, 
creates at least the possibility that excessive encouragement will be 
given to takeovers. The takeover of a well-managed company might be 
profitable at a tender price above the true value of the shares, if a 
freezeout could later be accomplished at a price sufficiently below true 
value.248 
246. Development of a mechanism other than tender offers by which outside common share-
holqers could force insiders to maximize the value of the corporation might make it unnecessary 
to improve the tender offer mechanism. q: supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (possibili-
ties and limitations of derivative suit to compel dividend payments as such a mechanism). 
247. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 11, at 1359-62; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 
336-40. 
248. q: supra text accompanying note 64 (underestimation of true value by use of the weight-
ing method implies failure to deter a breach of fiduciary duty in a conflict-of-interest merger). 
Grossman and Hart point out that as "dilution," the permissible gap between the permissible 
freezeout price and the true value of a share, increases, the benefit to shareholders from encourag-
ing takeovers when management is inefficient must be balanced against the cost of receiving a 
lower price in a successful tender. They argue that there is an optimal amount of dilution, which 
maximizes the value of a share. Grossman & Hart, supra note 234, at 44-54, 59-60. 
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E. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION: ENCOURAGEMENT OF FREEZEOUTS 
OF "LOCKED-IN" OUTSIDERS 
Some commentators have argued that a freezeout can be advantageous 
to outsiders if there is little opportunity for them otherwise to sell their 
shares,249 especially if the freezeout price is above the market price. 250 
An appraisal remedy that properly values outsiders' shares would tend 
to discourage freezeouts, and thus arguably would deprive "locked-in" 
outsiders of opportunities to escape from ownership of their shares.251 
The immediate answer to this argument is that appraisals are not 
intended to encourage insiders to buy out "locked-in" outsiders at a 
bargain price; they are intended to award dissenters the fair value of 
their shares. The argument faces other difficulties as well. First, even if 
prevention of freezeouts at a price less than best-use value brings a pu-
tative disadvantage to outsiders, it also brings significant advantages: 
forced exchanges to which outsiders would object are discouraged, and 
a perverse incentive toward temporary mismanagement is removed.252 
Second, outsiders may fare better if they are "locked-in" than if 
freezeouts at bargain prices occur.253 A derivative sliit, the threat of a 
derivative suit, 254 or the development of another remedy255 might cor-
rect defects in management. For example, a third party might make a 
satisfactory tender offer or the legitimate synergistic advantages of a 
freezeout might lead insiders to propose one on fair terms. 256 Third, 
249. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987, 1002-
03 (1974); Hetherington, supra note 10, at 249-50. 
250. Hetherington, supra note 10, at 240, 251-52. C.f. Cash Tender Offirs.. supra note 238, at 
241-43 (a tender offer for less than liquidation value but more than market price might be advan-
tageous to outsiders). 
251. Sportswriter Red Smith told a story about the "Deacon," a boxing manager celebrated 
for his righteousness and shrewdness. The Deacon, conversing with a reporter in a hotel lobby 
late one night, was consulted by the house detective. "Sir, I just rolled a drunk for everything he 
had in his wallet, and now rm wondering whether I did right" "How much money," the Deacon 
asked, "did he have?" "Two hundred dollars," said the detective. "Put one hundred back in his 
wallet, and when he sobers up, he'll think that he spent the rest," was the Deacon's advice. The 
detective expressed his thanks and rushed off to follow this advice. The Deacon turned to the 
reporter and said with a sigh, "In this wicked world, one does what one can." 
Like the drunk who got half his money back, the outsider might be better off with an unfair 
freezeout than she would be if she continued to be locked in a minority position. Half a loaf is 
better than none. 
252. See supra note 224 and accompanying text 
253. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 11, at 1369. 
254. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text 
255. See supra note 246. 
256. C.f. Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Mod!ftcations, 26 
RUTGERS L. REv. 445,472,475-76 (1973) (although additional protection of preferred sharehold-
ers might discourage some recapitalizations proposed by the common shareholders which would 
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the appropriate redress for "locked-in" outsiders is not a valuation 
formula which encourages unfair freezeouts but a remedy which per-
mits outsiders to escape ownership on fair terms.257 If outsiders are 
willing to sell their locked-in shares at less than the best-use value of 
the corporation, they may bargain with insiders to do so, but the law 
should not impose such a bargain upon them. 
F. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION: PRECEDENT 
The case law on valuation under the Delaware appraisal statute began 
with Chicago Corp. v. Munds.258 There, dissenting holders of converti-
ble preferred stock objected to the appraisers' valuation, which was 
based solely on market value. The chancellor held that market price 
would not be adopted as the exclusive measure of value -qnder the ap-
praisal statute,,because market price is not always an accurate indicator 
of true worth.259 Approving the view that "appraisers, having made a 
full examination ofthe status of the company and its prospects, are in a 
better position to gauge the fair value of the ·stock than the outside 
public,"260 the chancellor emphasized that his holding was limited to 
the rejection of market value as the sole determinant of share value: 
"The instant case calls for an answer to the narrow question-is 'value' 
to be measured exclusively by market quotations when the same are 
available? The conclusion of the court is that it is not."261 
In response to the contention of the dissenters that their stock 
should be appraised on the basis of asset value, the chancellor re-
marked that to adopt this as a general rule would "[leave] out of ac-
count all the elements which contribute to value as incidental to a 
going enterprise."262 This objection to the use of asset value as a deter-
minant for appraisal implicitly assumes that asset value is less than 
earnings value. Later cases ignored this assumption and cited Munds 
for the proposition that the value of a corporation can never be equal to 
be better for the preferred than the status quo, the co=on might still find it in their interest to 
propose recapitalizations which meet the tougher standard). 
257. C.f. Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statuto'}' Solution to 
the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 52-59 (1977) (statute proposed under 
which an outside shareholder in a solvent corporation whose stock is not listed or regularly quoted 
over-the-counter could require the corporation to buy her shares). The proposed statute should be 
modified to prohibit use of the weighting method. Contra id. at 57. 
258. 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 {1934). 
259. Id. at 151-55, 172 A. at 455-57. 
260. Id. at 153, 172 A. at 456. 
261. Id. at 154, 172 A. at 457. 
262. Id. at 150, 172 A. at 455. 
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its asset value.263 This later misuse of the chancellor's opinion disre-
garded his carefully drawn limitation on the scope of his remarks: 
"Market value undoubtedly is a pertinent consideration. So is net asset 
value. Neither, however, deserves necessarily to be accepted as 
exclusive."264 
Judicial misuse of the Munds holding began with the appraisal of 
preferred stock in Root v. York Cop. ,265 in which a different chancellor 
relied solely on Munds for the proposition that in an appraisal, 
"[n]either the net asset value nor any other single factor could be the 
controlling element."266 With seeming approval, the Root opinion 
summarized expert testimony offered by the corporation to the effect 
that there is little correlation between intrinsic value and asset value of 
stock, including an expert's assertion that: 
[I]n my opinion, assets are not of any great importance in determin-
ing the value of the stock . .. because after all the purposes of assets 
is to have earning power and if the Company does not have earning 
power it does not have earning power however great its assets may 
be_267 
This statement would have been incorrect if it had been addressed to 
the valuation of a corporation, because asset value is the best-use value 
of a corporation which has no earnings value. Indeed, asset value is 
unimportant to value only if earnings value is greater. 268 There is some 
truth to the statement, however, with respect to the valuation of pre-
ferred stock, and all of the corporation's experts emphasized that they 
were limiting their testimony to the value of the stock as opposed to the 
value of the corporation.269 Preferred shareholders are not assured of 
receiving at least the asset value of their stock; common shareholders 
may block a liquidation that would maximize the value of the corpora-
tion, in order to avoid the liquidation preference of the preferred stock 
until the preferred shareholders have agreed to give up part of their 
claim.270 Even if earnings value of the corporation exceeded asset 
263. See infra note 275 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 304. The court 
in Munds asserted that there may be some corporations which should not be valued at their asset 
values. See infra text accompanying note 264. The transformation to the proposition that no 
corporation should be valued at its asset value is an elementary error in logic. See I. COPI, SYM-
BOLIC LOGIC 67-69 {1973). 
264. 20 Del. Ch. at 55, 172 A. at 457 (emphasis added). 
265. 29 Del. Ch. 351, 50 A.2d 52 (1946). 
266. Id at 359, 50 A.2d at 56. 
267. Id at 361, 50 A.2d at 57 (emphasis added). 
268. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. 
269. 29 Del. Ch. at 361-62, 50 A.2d at 57. 
270. See_ e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 204-05 (D. Del.), qfid, 146 
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value, the preferred shareholders might receive less than their claim on 
asset value through delay of the common shareholders in paying off 
arrearages. The value of the future receipts of the preferred sharehold-
ers is dependent on the rate at which the common shareholders are 
expected to be able and willing to use earnings of the corporation to 
pay off arrearages on the preferred.271 Because the issue before the 
court was the value of preferred shares with substantial arrearages, the 
court's remarks do not constitute a holding that the value of a corpora-
tion may be lower than its asset value. Indeed, the proposition that the 
value of a corporation must be at least as high as its asset value was 
apparently not advanced by its dissenters. 
The only Delaware case which has considered that proposition is 
In re General Realty & Utilities Corp. 272 There, the appraiser had 
found market value per preferred share to be $90; asset value per share 
to be $129.61; and earnings value per share to be $83. The appraiser 
decided on a per share value of $120, without explaining the precise 
derivation of this result. As part of his conclusion, the appraiser 
reasoned: 
[I]t certainly cannot be said that the intrinsic value of any share-
holder's interest in a going Corporation at a given time is less than he 
could realize for it upon a liquidation of the Corporation's assets at 
that time. If that be the situation in any Corporation, surely its time 
for liquidation has arrived.273 
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Bove v. 
Co=unity Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969). If the corporation's investment oppor-
tunities do not justify retention of the funds, such a threat to withhold dividends blocks an advan-
tageous use of the corporation's resources. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
Even in a struggle between preferred and co~on shareholders, the expert's claim that "as-
sets are not of any great importance in determining the value of the stock" is still inaccurate 
because asset value would be a subject of the bargaining between co=on and preferred. 
271. The investment value standard; developed to test the fairness of recapitalizations and 
required under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976), would 
measure the value of preferred stock by the present value of the dividends expected to be paid 
under the strong assumption that arrearages will be paid back with future earnings as quickly as 
possible. See In re Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc., 30 S.E.C. 834, 910, 913, 919 (1950). Arrearages 
might well be paid at a rate slower than assumed. The investment value standard Ltas been pro-
posed as a test of the fairness of voluntary recapitalizations affecting preferred stock. See authori-
ties cited in Brudney, supra note 256, at 468 n.55. Professor Brudney advocates the liquidation 
preference as a measure of the claims of preferred shareholders once a voluntary recapitalization 
is proposed. Id passim. 
In any event, the effect on the value of preferred shares of the inability of preferred share-
holders to force payment of arrearages, or of dividends as they come due, cannot be measured by 
taking a weighted average of earnings value and asset value. 
272. 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Del. Ch. 1947). 
273. Id at 497, 52 A.2d at 14 (emphasis in original). This language should perhaps be quali-
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This cogent statement of a general principle of valuation was rejected 
by Chancellor Seitz, who relied solely on precedent: 
[T]he Appraiser indicated that the "intrinsic value" of a stockholder's 
shares in a going concern should always be more than their ... liq-
uidating value, and if the situation is otherwise, he suggests that the 
Corporation is a proper subject for liquidation. I cannot believe the 
Appraiser intended to convey the thought that the appraised value of 
shares under our statute should never be less than their hypothetical 
liquidating value because such is not the law. As the New York 
court recently said in Application of Behrens . . . : 
''Net asset value is entitled to weight, but it must be 
remembered that an appraisal is not a liquidation, and that 
the stock must be appraised on a going concecl basis (Mat-
ter of Fulton) with ·the possibility in different cases that the 
value of the stock may be substantially above or below net 
asset or break-up value. National Bank of Commerce v .. City 
of New Bet!ford; Lebold v. InlandS. S. Co." 
Such a result is implicit in the language of the court in Chicago Cor-
poration v. Munds. See also Jones v. Hea!y.274 
Although this passage implied that the law was settled, only one 
directly supporting authority275 was cited, In re Behrens,276 a New 
York trial court decision. The significance of the material quoted from 
Behrens was limited by the fact that preferred shares were being ap-
praised.277 In declining to award the full amount of net asset value,278 
fied if the corporation has preferred stock outstanding. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying 
text. 
274. Id at 498, 52 A.2d at 15 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), affd, 271 A.D. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947)). 
275. Two cases were cited by analogy, both incorrectly. The first, Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 
20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A.452 (Del. Ch. 1934), held only that appraisal value need not always be 
equal to market value and implicitly recognized that asset value will frequently be less than the 
best-use value of the corporation. See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text. 
The second case cited by analogy was Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. 
Ct. 1945), a trial court opinion by the author of Behrens. A closed-end investment trust was being 
appraised according to procedures established by the trust's articles of association. The appraisal, 
which the court declined to set aside, valued a share at $1.00 more than market value. The shares 
sold at a discount from the value per share of the company's investments. Id at 926-27, 55 
N.Y.S.2d at 352. As the court noted, id at 937, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 360, this is typical of closed-end 
investment companies. See infra note 311 and accompanying text. This special characteristic of 
closed-end investment companies distinguishes Jones from cases involving other kinds of corpora-
tions. See infra notes 311-15 and accompanying text. In any event, a compromise between market 
value and asset value may be justifiable. See supra notes 196, 213; infra note 315 and accompany-
ing text. 
276. 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), affd, 271 A.D. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947). 
277. The court did not mention any facts that wonld indicate a conflict of interest. Failure by 
the court to discuss whether the merger was at arm's length neglects a factor bearing heavily on 
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the Behrens court noted that the preferred shareholders were subject to 
delays, risks, and limitations on potential payments if the corporation 
was not liquidated. Furthermore, the dividend rate on the preferred 
shares was below the current market rate for other preferred stock 
which had a greater probability of paying dividends. In addition, the 
stock in Behrens was callable at a price which set a ceiling on the possi-
ble return from holding the shares. 279 
The language from Behrens relied solely on precedent, without 
any discussion of the principles of financial analysis, 'and furthermore, 
the precedent was misused by the court. A New York case, In re 
Fulton ,280 was the only authority cited for the assertion that "an ap-
praisal is not a liquidation, and . . . the stock must be appraised on a 
going concern basis."281 The court in In re Fulton, however, did not 
say that stock must be appraised on a going-concern basis when a 
higher value could be realized by the sale of the corporation's assets. 
The case merely held that a New York appraisal of a corporation that 
had been dissolved was not governed by a formula adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court for valuing preferred shares.282 There-
jected formula treated preferred and common shares as equivalent by 
dividing the sum of the capital stock and the surplus by the total 
number of shares, both common and preferred. 283 Thus, In re Fulton 
addressed the standard by which the claims of a preferred shareholder, 
as compared to those of a common shareholder, should be measured in 
an appraisal. As to the valuation of the corporation, In re Fulton 
merely said that appraisers should consider those economic factors 
which are relevant in the circumstances, giving each factor "such con-
sideration as to them seems proper .... "284 The misuse of In re 
Fulton in Behrens is made apparent by the statement in In re Fulton 
that the per share value of the applicable assets was ''the only factor to 
whether the merger price is likely to represent a fair valuation. See supra note 27 and accompany-
ing text. In fact, there was a conflict of interest: the corporation whose shareholders dissented in 
Behrens was a subsidiary of its merger partner. Moooy's MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, INDUS· 
TR1A"L SECURITIES 1595 (1945). 
278. The court conceded, however, that, "In some cases the appraisal may come out at or 
close to market value, and in others at or close to net asset value." 61 N.Y.S.2d at 183. 
279. Id at 154. This argument is sufficient to support the result of Behrens. See supra notes 
270-71 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 299-301. 
280. 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). 
281. 61 N.Y.S.2d at 183. 
282. Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922). 
283. 257 N.Y. at 490-96, 178 N.E. at 767-69. 
284. Id at 495, 178 N.E. at 769. 
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consider under the facts in this case"285-virtually a direct contradic-
tion of the proposition for which it was cited in Behrens. 
The court in Behrens cited two other authorities for the proposi-
tion that there is a ''possibility in different. cases that the value of the 
stock may be substantially above or below net asset or break-up 
value."286 The first part of the proposition is obviously correct: the 
intrinsic value of stock may be substantially above net asset value. No 
explanation other than the authority of the two cases was offered for 
the second part of the proposition, however, and in fact, no explanation 
is possible: stock can never be less valuable than its asset value.287 The 
first case, National Bank of Commerce v. City of New Bedford,288 held 
that assessment of the state corporate franchise tax should be based on 
market value ofthe shares if a corporation's operations were being con-
tinued, even if the liquidation value per share was higher.289 The deci-
sion was based on statutory interpretation.290 An alternative ground 
was available, but it was not discussed by the court. The history of 
Massachusetts taxing statutes provided good reason to regard the stat-
ute in question as contemplating assessment of the franchise tax on the 
basis of market value of the corporation's shares.291 
285. Id at 494, 178 N.E. at 769. The statement is dictum, however, because ~e court valued 
the preferred stock at par, basing its conclusion on an examination of the capital stock account of 
the corporation. Id at 495, 178 N.E. at 769. 
286. 61 N.Y.S.2d at 183. 
287. The second part of the proposition may of course be true for preferred stock, for reasons 
that the Behrens court advanced in another part of the opinion. See supra notes 277-79 and ac-
companying text; i'!fra text accompanying notes 299-301. 
288. 155 Mass. 313, 29 N.E. 532 (1892). 
289. Id at 313-16, 29 N.E. at 532-33. 
290. Id at 314-15, 29 N.E. at 533. Holmes did say that if the corporation was to continue in 
business, market value was ''the full amoi.mt of cash that could be got or ought to be got for a 
share," Id at 315, 29 N.E. at 533. Holmes was addressing, in a dispute between a corporation and 
the taxing authorities, the question of whether market value should be used as a standard under a 
particular statute even though it was less than asset value. His remarks could not constitute ap-
proval of an assertion by management that the true value of a corporation is less than the amount 
realizable by liquidation. From the facts given in the opinion, it is impossible even to determine 
whether earnings value, and thus best-use value, exceeded asset value. 
291. The statute construed in National Banlc of Commerce required that a corporation be 
assessed on the basis of the "fair cash value" of its shares. 155 Mass. at 314, 29 N.E. at 532. 
Similar Massachusetts statutes :tJroviding for taxation of corporations on the basis of "fair cash 
valuation" of its shares had already been definitively interpreted as calling for assessment based 
on market value of the shares. For a discussion of the history of the statutes, see Commissioner of 
Corps. & Taxation v. Boston Edison Co., 310 Mass. 674, 679-94, 39 N.E.2d 584, 588-95 (1942). 
The Massachusetts corporate tax under both the state and federal constitutions had been held to 
be valid only if based on market value of the corporation's shares, rather than on its property. 
Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 94 Mass. (1 Allen) 298, 301-04, 306-07 (1866), affd, 73 
u.s. 632 (1867). . 
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The second case cited in Behrens, Lebold v. Inland Steel, 292 merely 
held that the true value of a corporation may be less than or greater 
than its book value.293 This, of course, is correct because book value is 
usually the result of accounting conventions and bears little relation to 
the j,ntrinsic value of a corporation.294 Moreover, the Lebold court held 
it was error for the lower court to refuse to consider the high earnings 
value of the corporation, which was "a going prosperous concem."295 
The Lebold opinion thus correctly analyzed a situation in which earn-
ings value exceeded asset value, so that the true value also exceeded 
asset value. Citing that opinion for the proposition that the true value 
of a corporation may be less than asset value, as Behrens did, was high-
ly misleading. 
Thus, both General Realty and the case on which it heavily relied, 
Behrens, were based on a misreading of precedent. Both cases ignored 
or misconstrued language consistent with the proposition of selecting 
asset value as the value of the corporation when asset value is higher 
than earnings value.296 Cases with narrow holdings, involving statu-
tory construction297 or compromise between asset value and market 
value of a closed-end investment company298 were erroneously given 
broad readings. 
Moreover, in both Behrens and General Realty a special circum-
stance existed:. the stock appraised at less than asset value was pre-
ferred stock.299 Unlike common stock, the Umited nature of the rights 
of the preferred shareholders to immediate payment may justify a valu-
ation which is less than asset value. 300 The weighting method is not, 
292. 82 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936). 
293. Id at 356. 
294. See st~pra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
295. Earnings had averaged $134.00 per share over the 10 years from 1925 to 1934; an earn-
ings value of over $2000.00 per share was regarded by the court as plausibie. 82 F.2d at 352. The 
$700.00 per share offered to the outsiders, id at 352-53, was apparently regarded by outsiders as 
equal to the asset value per share, since they contended that 
the whole project was part of a plan to force liquidation of the physical assets of a going 
prosperous concern and get rid of the minority stockholders by paying them the proceeds 
of their share of such assets, but leaving them without any of the fruit of their investment 
in the way of capitalization of earnings. 
Id at 354. 
296. See st~pra note 275 (discussion of Chicago Corp. v. Munds); stpra notes 280-85, 293-95 
and accompanying text. 
297. See st~pra notes 288-91 and accompanying text. 
298. See S11pra note 275 (discussion of Jones v. Healy). 
299. See st~pra notes 272, 277-79, and accompanying text. 
300. See st~pra notes 270-71 and accompanying text. 
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however, a rational way to evaluate the preferred stock limitations. 301 
In Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye,302 the Delaware Supreme 
Court's first opinion on valuation under the Delaware appraisal statute, 
the court expressed its approval for the idea that the value of a corpora-
tion may be less than its asset value. The court claimed to be adopting 
principles first formulated in Munds and followed in Root and General 
Realty: 
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the 
stockholder is to be paid for that which has been taken from him, 
viz., his proportional share in a going concern. . . . In determining 
what figure represents . . . true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and 
the courts must take into consideration all factors and elements 
which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. . . . 
... [S]ince intrinsic or true value is to be ascertained, the prob-
lem will not be settled by acceptance as the sole measure of only one 
element entering into value without considering other elements. For 
example, as was specifically held in Chicago Corp. v. Munds . . . 
market value may not be taken as the sole measure of the value of 
the stock. So, also, since value is to be :fixed on a going-concern ba-
sis, the liquidating value of the stock may not be accepted as the sole 
measure.303 
The concluding sentence repeated the distortion of Munds which 
originated in Root v. York.304 
The word "consideration" was used ambiguously in this passage. 
Consideration of all factors may mean that asset value, earnings value, 
and all other evidence of value are assessed and compared in valuing 
the corporation, even though one or more of those factors may finally 
be deemed to play little or no role in determining the corporation's 
value.305 This interpretation of consideration is consistent with ordi-
nary use oflanguage3°6 and also with generally accepted security anal-
301. See supra note 271. 
302. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (DeL 1950). 
303. Id at 526, 74 A.2d at 72. 
304. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text. 
305. An analogy to the law of evidence exists: "consideration" of a factor is like admission of 
evidence; the importance, if any, to be given to the evidence is to be determined by the factfinder. 
C'f. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 338 N.E.2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975): 
[A]ll three elements do not have to influence the result in every valuation proceeding. It 
suffices if they are all considered. Compelling the consideration of all of them, including 
those which may turn out to be unreliable in a particular case, has the salutary effect of 
assuring more complete justification by the appraiser of the conclusion he reaches. It 
also provides a more concrete basis for court review. 
Id at 588, 338 N.E.2d at 616, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
306. One definition of "consider'' is ''to think carefully about, esp. in order to make a deci-
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ysis. Best-use value can only be determined by consideration of both 
asset value and earnings value. In Tri-Continental, however, a special, 
narrow meaning seems to have been assigned: consideration is given to 
a factor only if the factor increases or decreases the valuation. 307 Sub-
sequently, this use of the word was translated into the proposition that 
giving consideration to a factor requires that the factor receive a nonne-
gative weight. 308 
The quoted passage was also ambiguous in stating that "value is to 
be fixed on a going-concern basis., If the best course of action is to 
continue a corporation as a going concern, it would of course be incor-
rect to use liquidating value as the sole measure of value or even to 
include liquidating value in the calculation of value, except as a floor 
on the potential decline in earnings value. The ambiguous reference to 
valuation "on a going-concern basis'' suggests that liquidation value 
cannot be used as the value of the corporation, even when that is the 
best-use value, if management has failed to liquidate the corporation. 
The ambiguity lies in the use of the term "going concern., A corpora-
tion which has not been liquidated may be described as a "going con-
cern,, but earnings value is also often referred to as "going-concern, 
value. Consolidation of the two concepts allows courts to avoid an in-
quiry into whether the corporation's maximum value is actually 
achieved as a going concern. 309 
Th~ misleading language should have been limited by the facts of 
Tri-Continental, because in that case a closed-end investment company 
was the subject of appraisal. The appraisal affirmed by the court was 
based on an average of the month-end values of the assets in the invest-
ment company's portfolio.310 A deduction from this average was made 
to reflect the fact that shares in closed-end investment companies, for a 
variety of reasons,311 sell in the market at a discount from their net 
asset value. Inability to sell shares at a market price which corresponds 
to the underlying net asset value is a disadvantage which is presumably 
accepted by all shareholders in closed-end investment companies. It is 
·sion; contemplate; reflect on." THE RANDOM HOUSE DicriONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
312 (J. Stein ed. 1973). 
307. 31 Del. Ch. at 530, 74 A.2d at 74. 
308. See. e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730, 735 (Del. ·ch. 1978), qff'd, 413 A.2d 
137 (Del. 1980). 
309. C.f. mpra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (rejection in Delaware of "going-concern 
asset value" as "comparatively an ethereal concept.") 
310. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 531, 74 A.2d 71, 75 (Del. 1950). 
311. See Malkiel, The Valuatlon of Closed-End Investment Company Shares, 32 J. FIN. 847, 
851-58 (1977). 
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arguable whether the discount which would apply in a hypothetical 
market sale should be disregarded when insiders312 are themselves ob-
taining ,the net assets fr~e of the closed-end format which generates the 
discount.313 However, the discount at which shares in a closed-end in-
vestment company sell provides a sufficient explanation for the valua-
tion of the shares in Tri-Continentaf3 14 at less than asset value.315 
IV. RECONCILING DELAWARE CASE LAW WITH SOUND 
PRINCIPLES OF VALUATION 
The initial failure to adopt best-use value ·in Delaware appraisals was 
the result of misreading earlier cases, but a weighted average of earn-
ings value and asset value continues to be employed in subsequent Del-
aware opinions.316 However, as Justice Quillen of the Delaware 
Supreme Court remarked, "[T]his Court should not foster an unneces-
sary damages forum because of any judicial limitation placed on the 
statutory appraisal procedure. Rather, we should encourage this legis-
latively established valuation process to be open to generally accepted 
techniques of valuation used in other areas of business and law."317 
Thus, the adoption of best-use valuation in Delaware would improve 
the substantive-law of valuation and would not violate the principle of 
stare decisis. 
312. The closed-end investment company was being merged with its parent. Tri-Continental 
Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 101, 102, 66 A.2d 910, 911 (Del. Ch. 1949), rev'd, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 
A.2d 71 (Del. 1950). 
313. In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-58 (1977), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's adherence to net asset value as a standard offaimess under Section 17 of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § SOa-17 (1976), was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court as an appropriate application of a standard developed by an expert administrative agency. 
Insiders had merged DuPont with an undesired closed-end investment company which had been 
used to hold 28.3% of DuPont's common stock. The holding company's DuPont stock was ex-
changed at a 2.5% discount for DuPont stock issued directly to the shareholders in the investment 
coml?any. The contention that the exchange ratio should have reflected more of the 23% discount 
from net asset value at which holding company stock had been selling was rejected by the Com-
mission, which stated, "[a]n investment company ... can normally be presumed to be worth its 
'net asset value." 432 U.S. at 51. 
31~. 31 Del. Ch. at 528-31, 74 A.2d at 74-77 (Del. 1950). 
315. If market value is less than asset value, but is untainted by a parent-subsidiary relation-
ship, a weighted average of asset value and market value, regarded as independent estimates of 
value, may be acceptable. See supra notes 196, 213. No satisfactory justification exists for taking 
a weighted average of the asset value and the earnings value, however. 
316. For a summary of important cases using the weighting method, see Note, supra note 6, at 
641-42. A weight of zero was assigned to asset value in Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 
460 (Del. Ch. 1975), but this did not result in a correct calculation of best-use value. See supra 
notes 135-58 and accompanying text. 
317. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1040 n.l2 (Del 1979) (Quillen, J., 
dissenting). 
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In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. 318 Justice Quillen repeated his call 
for the use of generally accepted techniques of evaluation in appraisals. 
He adverted to the possibility that "in the past the process has been 
burdened· by too strict an adherence to precedent from different factual 
contexts than a case at hand"319 and warned that "it can be a mistake to 
read past appellate decisions on evaluation as a bar to future creativity 
and fresh approach~s.'mo 
Justice Quillen suggested that Delaware appraisal precedents 
could be reconciled with accepted techniques of valuation through the 
''wide :flexibility'' permitted in the selection of weights, observing that 
an increase in the relative weight for asset value in Bell would have 
brought the appraised value closer to the corporation's high liquidation 
value.321 This suggestion is unsound. Correct valuation usually re-
quires that the lower of asset value and earnings value be disre-
garded.322 Although disregarding a value is equivalent to assigning a 
weight of zero to the factor, the manipulation of weights to achieve that 
result would not enhance the clarity of valuation procedure and might 
perpetuate confusion. 323 
A more promising avenue for adoption of best-use valuation is 
found in Justice Quillen's statements that the treatment of a factor in 
an earlier case need not be replicated in a case with different facts and 
that what is appropriate in -some circumstances may be impermissible 
318. 413 A.2d 137, 150-51 (DeL 1980). 
319. Id at 151 (Quillen, J., concurring). 
320. Id at 150 (Quillen, J., concurring). 
-321. Id at 151 (Quillen, J., concurring). In Metromont Materials Corp. v. Pennell, 270 S.C. 9, 
24,239 S.E.2d 753,761 (1977), the court assigned a weight of95% to net asset value of$785.01 and 
a weight of 5% to an earnings value of 0, to yield an appraisal award of $745.76 per share. The 
seemingly h!gh weight for asset value was not high enough. Since asset value exceeded earnings 
value for the company (a closely held family corporation for holding real estate), assigning a 5% 
weight to earnings value reduced the award to 5% below best-use value. Moreover, the corpora-
tion had conceded that asset value should receive a high weight. It had proposed a weight of 90%, 
while the outsiders argned for a weight of 100%. 
In King v. Southwestern Cotton Oil Co., 585 P.2d 385 (Okl. Ct. App. 1978), the appellate 
court affirmed the trial court's assignment of a weight of 100% to net asset value, based on testi-
mony by a professor of finance who emphasized that the company's major asset, a portfolio of 
securities, was oriented toward the production of capital gains. Id at 390-92. However, the com-
pany was also operating a machine stop and planned to continue to .do so. Id at 387-88. Thus, its 
best-use value was probably the sum of the earnings value of the machine shop and the value of 
the surplus assets. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. 
322. See supra notes 38-64, 96-106, 126-34 and accompanying text. 
323. Cf. supra notes 88-95, 124-25, 170-75 and accompanying text (confusion resulting from 
failure to analyze correctly the error introduced by application of the weighting method). 
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in others.3~4 For example, asset value should be disregarded when it is 
less than earnings value, but not when it exceeds earnings value. A 
reexamination of the Delaware precedent in the light of generally ac-
cepted principles of valuation, as suggested by Justice Quillen, should 
lead to judicial recognition of the principle that corporation valuations 
should proceed from the premise that the best use will be made of the 
corporation's resources. 
Judicial correction of the fallacy inherent in the weighting method 
would be proper because continued use of an inaccurate valuation 
method is inconsistent with the fabric of Delaware corporation law. 
First, the purpose of the appraisal remedy is to give outside sharehold-
ers the economic value of their shares, rather than some lesser 
amount.325 If appraisals do not comply with sound principles of 
:financial analysis, courts will be pressured to develop other remedies.32~ 
Second, the power of an appraiser to consult the books and records of a 
corporation in determining ''the value of the shares upon such investi-
gation as to him seems proper,"327 granted under the earlier versions of 
the statute, calls for general principles of analysis rather than any spe-
cific mechanism for calculating that value. Third, the current use of the 
weighting method is based on the mistaken belief that it yields sound 
valuations. The weighting method is said to be justified because prece-
dent has established it as a means of determining ''the actual value of 
324. 413 A.2d at 150-51. Justice Quillen's exposition is impaired, however, by retention of the 
weighting method. 
325. This is the premise of the authorities cited supra in notes 10-24 and accompanying text. 
326. See supra text accompanying note 317. Cf. supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text 
(arguments that an additional remedy is needed for a shareholder objecting to a freezeout only if 
appraisal is insufficient). The holding in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), 
that a Delaware merger must have a purpose besides freezing out minority stockholders and must 
also be entirely fair to the minority, was accompanied by a declaration that "defendants cannot 
meet their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs simply by relegating them to a statutory appraisal 
proceeding." Id. at 977. 
327. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (1974). The current version grants the court discretion 
to permit discovery or other pretrial proceedings. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (Snpp. 1978). 
There is no indication that the revision was intended to diminish the freedom of the factfinder to 
analyze issues of value. In his concurring opinion in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 197 
(DeL 1980), Justice Quillen argued that the analytical freedom of the factfinder has been increased 
by the revision: 
[T]he statutory change shonld generally foster improvement in the proceeding by· as-
signing to chancery judges (with their judicial and equitable feel for flexibility and its 
relation to fairness) the trial function. It shonld be anticipated that if, in the past, the 
process has been burdened by too strict an adherence to precedent from different factual 
contexts than a case at hand, relief has been supplied by a change of the original forum. 
Id. at 151. 
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stock."328 Fourth, Delaware courts are willing to follow standard 
works on corporate valuation.329 For example, in Gibbons v. Schenley 
Industries., Inc. , a lower court adopted the reasoning of a standard 
work on security analysis to the effect that asset value is unimportant as 
compared to earnings value for an operating company.330 Largely 
based on this authority, the court went beyond previous cases and as-
signed a weight of zero to asset value, even though the lowest weight 
for asset value which the court could find in a prior Delaware decision 
was 12~%.331 Fifth, in appraisal cases D¥laware courts often engage in 
economic analysis of the financial evidence.332 Sixth, Delaware courts 
have declined to follow precedent which is economically unrealistic. 
The Delaware Supreme Court has, for example, corrected a line of ap-
praisal cases because their treatment of asset value had wandered away 
from the principles of financial analysis. 333 Thus, the use of weights 
should not be permitted to continue as an artificial method of valua-
328. Poole v. N.Y. Deli Maatschappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 286, 224 A.2d 260, 262 (Del. 1966) 
(nonappraisal case in which the weighting method was adopted in assessing damages). 
329. The most influential has been A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 
(5th ed. 1953), cited with approval in Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 287, 194 A.2d 
50, 57 (Del. Ch. 1963); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 89, 159 A.2d 278, 285 
(Del. Ch. 1960); Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 61, 67, 158 A.2d 797, 800 (Del. Ch. 
1960); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 566, 123 A.2d 121, 125 (Del. Ch. 1956). 
Although declining to adopt the specific multipliers advocated by Dewing, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware acknowledged in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 
219 (Del. 1975), that Dewing's "wor~ have been accorded deferential trea~ent in Delaware." 
B. GRAHAM, D. DoDD, & S. CoTTLE, supra note 122 was cited favorably in Tannetics, Inc. v. 
A.I. Indus., No. 5306 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1979), reprinted In 5 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 337, 348 (1980). See 
a/so l'!fra note 330 and accompanying text. J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 
was cited in Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 566, 123 A.2d 121, 125 (Del. Ch. 
1956). 
330. 339 A.2d 460, 473 (Del. Ch. 1975), citing B. GRAHAM, D. DoDD & S. CoTTLE, supra note 
246, at 217. Assignment of a zero weight to asset value was incorrect on the facts of Gibbons. See 
supra notes 135-59 and accompanying text. 
331. 339 A.2d at 473. See supra note 212. 
332. See_ e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 219-21, 
n.3 (Del. 1975) (changes in econoinic conditions since publication of A. DEWING, supra note 329; 
significance of upward trend in corporation's earnings; risks of motion picture industry; unreliabil· 
ity of market price where only a small percentage of stock is publicly held); Swanton v. State 
Guaranty Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 481-83, 215 A.2d 242, 245-46 (Del. Ch. 1965) (corporation's 
policy of seeking capital appreciation rather than operating income); Levin v. Midland-Ross 
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 278-79, 194 A.2d 50, 56 (Del. Ch. 1963) (clouded future for rayon tire cord 
industry and corporation's declining position' in that industry); Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 39 
Del. Ch. 61,67-69, 158 A.2d 797, 800-01 (Del. Ch. 1960) (measurement of earnings of corporation 
in an unstable market); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 564-65, 568-69, 123 
A.2d 121, 124,.127 (Del. Ch. 1956) (effect on market price of parent's purchase of subsidiary's 
stoclci corporation's expansion plans). 
The validity of the economic analyses used'by the courts varies, of course, from case to case. 
333. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
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tion, supported only by earlier judicial error. 334 Adoption of generally 
accepted principles of valuation, through the application of best-use 
analysis, would better serve the purposes of Delaware appraisal law. 
Other jurisdictions would no doubt follow Delaware's lead in 
adopting best-use valuation. Alternatively, other jurisdictions should 
independently recognize the flaw in the weighting method, and replace 
it with best-use valuation. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the appraisal process is to determine the true or intrin-
sic value of corporate shares. This Article has demonstrated that under 
all circumstances the weighting method systematically undervalues cor-
porate shares, and that the true value of a corporation is properly its 
best-use value.335 The best-use value of a corporation is simply the 
value derived when the corporation pursues its most profitable course, 
whether that course be continued operations or liquidation. Dissident 
shareholders foreed to accept less than the best-use value have been 
denied the true or intrinsic value of their shares. To give full effect to 
the appraisal remedy, therefore, courts should recognize the basic fal-
334. But cf. In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 413-15, 213 A.2d 203, 208-09 (Del. 
1965), where the court rejected the contention that dissenters frozen out for cash in a short-form 
merger should receive liquidation value upon appraisal, rather than the weighted value previously 
used in appraisals following a long-form merger. The court argued that, in enacting the short-
form merger statute, the legislature must be presumed to have acted with knowledge that courts 
use the weighting method in appraisals following long-form mergers. 
:rhe argument of the stockholders that the fact that they are being forced out of a going 
concern and being paid off in cash should lead to a measure of value which would give 
them that which they would have received in the event of dissolution, while perhaps 
superficially appealing, is more properly addressed to the General Assembly which en-
acted the law as we have found it. 
Id at 415, 213 A.2d at 208. 
A similar argument could be made that a legislature which adopts the revisions of the ap-
praisal sections of the Model Business Corporation Act tacitly "codifies" the judicially created 
weighting method, especially in view of the revisers' comment that the revision "leaves to the 
parties and ultimately to the courts the means by which fair value of the shares shall be deter-
mined, thereby leaving untouched the aceumulated case law about market value, capitalized earn-
ings value, and asset value." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 1874. Such arguments, 
however, are unsatisfactory. There is no reason to infer from revisions unrelated to valuation 
issues that a legislature intended to put an end to judicial development of valuation law. See H. 
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1401-05 (temp. ed. 1958). The· argument that the weight-
ing method is fiawed has seldom been discussed and has not been presented to any legislature. A 
legislature should not, therefore, be regarded as having made a decision on this point any more 
than a court should be regarded as having ruled on an argument that was not presented to it. 
335. Professor Hetherington has claimed: "Empirical evidence of actual disadvantages to 
shareholders [from going private transactions] is wholly lacking." Hetherington, supra note 10, at 
247-48. The fallacy of the weighting method described in this Article refutes this claim. 
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lacy inherent in the weighting method and adopt the best-use method 
of valuation. 
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